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ARTICLES 
THE AGENCY COSTS OF AGENCY CAPITALISM:  
ACTIVIST INVESTORS AND THE REVALUATION OF 
GOVERNANCE RIGHTS 
 
Ronald J. Gilson? & Jeffrey N. Gordon?? 
Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dis-
persed share ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm. Instead, we 
observe the reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional 
investment intermediaries, which gives rise to “the agency costs of agency 
capitalism.” This ownership change has occurred because of (i) political 
decisions to privatize the provision of retirement savings and to require 
funding of such provision and (ii) capital market developments that 
favor investment intermediaries offering low-cost diversified investment 
vehicles. A new set of agency costs arises because in addition to 
divergence between the interests of record owners and the firm’s 
managers, divergence exists between the interests of record owners—the 
institutional investors—and the beneficial owners of those institutional 
stakes. The business model of key investment intermediaries like mutual 
funds, which focus on increasing assets under management through 
superior relative performance, undermines their incentive and compe-
tence to engage in active monitoring of portfolio company performance. 
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Such investors will be “rationally reticent”—willing to respond to 
governance proposals but not to propose them.  
We posit that shareholder activists should be seen as playing a 
specialized capital market role of setting up intervention proposals for 
resolution by institutional investors. The effect is to potentiate institu-
tional investor voice, to increase the value of the vote, and thereby to 
reduce the agency costs we have identified. We therefore argue against 
recent proposed regulatory changes that would undercut shareholder 
activists’ economic incentives by making it harder to assemble a 
meaningful toehold position in a potential target. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The canonical account of U.S. corporate governance, which stresses 
the tension between dispersed shareholders and company managers in 
large public firms, has become factually obsolete and now provides a 
misleading framework for contemporary corporate governance theoriz-
ing. 1  In this account, framed eighty years ago by Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means, shareholders individually own too few shares to monitor 
                                                                                                                 
1. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United 
States, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1377, 1384, 1388 (2009) (noting, for S&P 500 firms, 89% have 
blockholders, and for all U.S. public firms, blockholder ownership averages 39%); see also 
Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? 83 Bus. Hist. Rev. 443, 
467 (2009) (noting U.S. ownership patterns are not monolithic, though ownership 
separation is useful reference point). 
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management’s performance and confront coordination costs that make 
collective monitoring difficult.2 But as we shall see, the Berle-Means 
premise of dispersed share ownership is now wrong. In 2011, for 
example, institutional investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock 
of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.3 
In this Article, we address the impact on corporate governance of 
the ownership reconcentration of U.S. public corporations. Beneficial 
owners now typically hold their equity interests through a set of interme-
diary institutions like pension funds and mutual funds, which are the 
actual record owners and hold equity as fiduciaries for their benefi-
ciaries. This shift from the Berle-Means archetype of widely distributed 
ownership to concentrated institutional ownership gives rise to what we 
call “agency capitalism,” an ownership structure in which agents hold 
shares for beneficial owners. The consequence is a double set of agency 
relationships: between shareholders and managers and between benefi-
cial owners and record holders.  
The familiar Berle-Means agency problem arises because of the 
divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders.4 In an 
agency capitalism world, there is added a new agency problem that 
results from the gap between the interests of institutional record owners 
and beneficial owners. As developed below, a significant percentage of 
these institutional fiduciaries have business models that limit their incen-
tives and capacity to monitor the business choices of their portfolio 
companies except through assessing stock market performance.5 The 
combination of limited institutional investor incentives and limited 
capacity establishes strong reasons to sell the stock of underperformers 
rather than to undertake a governance intervention.6 Record owners 
prefer exit to the exercise of governance rights even when a governance 
approach is more valuable to the beneficial owners. This devaluing of 
governance rights means that the reconcentrated (record) owners will 
have limited interest in or capacity to reduce the Berle-Means agency 
problem. 
                                                                                                                 
2. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property 47–65 (rev. ed. 1967). 
3. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. Inst. & Institutional S’holder Servs., 
Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Ten Year Performance and Risk 
Review 9–10 (2012), available at http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-Company-
ISS-Report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing empirical evidence of 
significant blockholdings in U.S. public corporations); Holderness, supra note 1, at 1379–
85 (same). 
4. See Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 112–16 (explaining “divergence of interest 
between ownership and control”). 
5. See infra Part III (discussing limitations of institutional ownership and agency 
costs). 
6. See infra notes 96–105 and accompanying text (discussing reasons institutional 
investors are reluctant to undertake governance intervention). 
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 Some jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom,7 the European 
Union,8 and Israel,9 have sought to bridge this gap by advocating a new 
set of governance obligations—those of “stewardship” or “sustainable 
engagement”—for institutional owners generally. From this perspective, 
the task is to “fix” the existing governance model to improve the opera-
tion of the capital markets. We present a very different view. We argue 
that the disinterest of these institutions in serving as active monitors of 
portfolio companies is an endogenous response to the particular agency 
relationships that arise from reconcentrated record ownership in invest-
ment intermediaries.10 In turn, the appearance of activist shareholders, 
                                                                                                                 
7. See Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stew
ardship-Code-September-2012.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing 
“institutional investor’s duty is to act in the interests of its . . . benficiaries” and describing 
“[s]tewardship activities” as including “monitoring and engaging with companies on 
matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance”); 
John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making 44 
(2012) [hereinafter Kay, The Kay Review], available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISC
ore/business-law/docs/K/12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (“All participants in the equity investment chain should  
act according to the principles of stewardship, based on respect for those whose  
funds are invested or managed, and trust in those by whom the funds are invested or 
managed . . . .”). 
8. See Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, at 
11–12, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_m
arket/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (discussing “lack of shareholder engagement” and European Commission’s 
options to facilitate engagement); Resolution on a Corporate Governance Framework for 
European Companies, Eur. Parl. Res. (A7-0051/2012) ¶¶ 25, 34, 2012 O.J. (C 161) 
(adopting text P7_TA(2012)0118) (emphasizing European Parliament “[w]elcomes the 
development of Stewardship Codes for institutional investors across the European Union” 
and “believes that a European Stewardship Code could be developed”). Based on the 
consultation process around its Green Paper, the European Commission recently 
published its 2012 “Action Plan” for European company law and corporate governance 
that will include an “initiative . . . on the disclosure of voting and engagement policies as 
well as voting records by institutional investors.” Action Plan: European Company Law and 
Corporate Governance—A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and 
Sustainable Companies, at 8, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/121212_company-law-cor
porate-governance-action-plan_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also id. 
(“Effective, sustainable shareholder engagement is one of the cornerstones of listed 
companies’ corporate governance model . . . .”). 
9. See Principal Recommendations of the Committee on Enhancing Competitiveness 
(Isr.), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/lists/list26/attachments/291/2011-1111.pdf 
(translation on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) 
(recommending, among other things, encouragement of institutional investors to play 
activist role). For an analysis finding similar behavior and similar problems by institutions 
worldwide, see generally OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good 
Corporate Governance (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovern
anceprinciples/49081553.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
10. See infra Part III (discussing limitations of institutional ownership and agency 
costs). 
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such as hedge funds, who acquire a significant but noncontrolling stake 
in a corporation and then try to alter the company’s business strategy 
initially through persuasion but sometimes through a follow-on proxy 
contest, should be seen as an endogenous response to the monitoring 
shortfall that follows from ownership reconcentration in intermediary 
institutions.11  
In this analysis, the activist shareholders are governance interme-
diaries: They function to monitor company performance and then to 
present to companies and institutional shareholders concrete proposals 
for business strategy through mechanisms less drastic than takeovers. 
These activists gain their power not because of their equity stakes, which 
are not controlling, but because of their capacity to present convincing 
plans to institutional shareholders, who ultimately will decide whether 
the activists’ proposed plan should be followed. As this Article develops, 
institutional shareholders are not “rationally apathetic” as were the dis-
persed owners on whose behalf the institutions now hold shares, but 
instead are “rationally reticent”: Intermediary institutional holders will 
respond to proposals but are unlikely themselves to create them. The 
role for activist shareholders is to potentiate institutional voice; specialists 
in monitoring combine through the capital markets with specialists in 
low-cost diversification to provide a form of market-based stewardship.  
The governance problem that arises from the “separation of owner-
ship from control” is the undervaluation of the vote as a mechanism to 
impose change. The reconcentration of ownership through institutions 
adds only marginally to the value of the vote, much less than otherwise 
would be expected, because of the agency problems of agency capitalism. 
The role of a new entrant into the governance story, the activist share-
holder, is to increase the value of the vote held by the institutions by 
teeing up the intervention choices at low cost to the institutional owners. 
If the intervention is successful, the activist’s equity position will increase 
in value, as will that of the institutions. The expectation of that increase 
gives the activist the incentive to proceed, which in turn mitigates a 
problem of agency capitalism.  
As we will show, the move to reconcentrated ownership in invest-
ment intermediaries is a consequence of two factors: first, the political 
decisions to privatize retirement provisioning (beyond the social safety 
net of Social Security) and to facilitate advance funding; and second, the 
intellectual triumph of modern portfolio theory, which promotes 
diversification as the touchstone investment strategy.12 The result is a 
fundamental shift, from a Berle-Means capital market characterized by 
passive dispersed shareholders to one of agency capitalism characterized 
by concentrated but reticent intermediaries. This shift illustrates both the 
                                                                                                                 
11. See infra Part IV (discussing role of activists as governance arbitrageurs and 
solution to agency costs of agency capitalism). 
12. See infra Part II (discussing these two factors). 
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fact that corporate governance is bound up with the way capital markets 
support the transfer of risk to investors, and the direction of causation. 
Changes in the available mechanisms of risk transfer drive ownership 
changes; corporate governance institutions then adapt to ensure an 
allocation of governance rights that facilitates the available risk transfer 
techniques. Thus, innovation in the capital markets determines the effi-
cient structure of corporate governance: The manner in which risk is 
transferred and the corresponding governance structure that supports 
that transfer depend on the evolution of the capital markets.  
Contemporary objections to the role of activist investors largely 
ignore how activist investors are the product of the changes in U.S. 
equity ownership, and that they operate to revalue governance rights, 
whose value depreciated as they came to be held by institutions in whose 
business model governance rights were at best peripheral. 13  Stated 
simply, the availability of low-cost diversification under the aegis of 
institutional investors, combined with the corresponding institutional 
investor business model, creates the agency costs of agency capitalism. A 
corporate governance structure that was suited to a Berle-Means owner-
ship distribution must evolve in response to the change in ownership 
distribution.  
Regulatory regimes must also adjust. The current debate over new 
regulatory interventions that can affect the incentives of potential 
governance activists highlights the need for complementarity between 
ownership patterns and governance and regulatory structures. As we will 
argue, debates over the terms of the stock accumulation disclosure 
triggered under the Williams Act14 so far have largely ignored the evolu-
tion of capital markets since 1967 and the resulting change in ownership 
patterns, even though the SEC has ample discretion to take those new 
patterns into account. 
Reflecting the authors’ expertise, this Article focuses largely on the 
evolution of U.S. ownership patterns and governance structures. How-
ever, our analysis should prove useful in assessing developments in other 
countries. In particular, the efforts in jurisdictions as different as the 
European Union, the United Kingdom, and Israel seek to harness institu-
tional investors as “stewards,” that is, as active monitors of long-term 
                                                                                                                 
13. E.g., Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts 
on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of 
Shareholder Power, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–4), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138945 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing SEC 
should modify section 13(d) reporting rules to limit activists’ ability to acquire substantial 
stakes without disclosure to market); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The 
Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 47–49 (2012) 
(examining empirical evidence of value of activist blockholders).  
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006) (requiring any person acquiring more than 5% of 
beneficial ownership of registered equity security to file report with SEC within ten days 
after acquisition). 
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company performance.15 These efforts, it will be apparent, ignore that 
the structure of agency capitalism gives intermediary institutional 
investors little incentive to play this role; as a result, the institutions 
largely lack the competence to undertake it. 
Part I illustrates the direction of causation between capital markets 
innovation and corporate governance by rehearsing examples of how 
changes in the capital markets give rise to responsive changes in govern-
ance. Part II then takes up the evolution of agency capitalism in response 
to developments in the capital markets, stressing the impact of changes 
in the financing of retirement security. Part III argues that a regime of 
agency capitalism results in the general undervaluation of governance 
rights, which sets up Part IV’s framing of a role for active investors as 
governance intermediaries (or, more specifically, as governance rights 
arbitrageurs). Finally, Part V considers the existing regulatory environ-
ment, including current reform proposals, in light of their effect on the 
supply of activist shareholders, with particular emphasis on proposals in 
the United States (and actions already taken in the United Kingdom and 
E.U. member states) to eliminate most of the timing gap between an 
activist investor’s acquisition of the disclosure-triggering percentage of a 
company’s shares and its obligations to publicly disclose its 
shareholdings. We conclude by reemphasizing the complementarities 
between institutional investors and activists, in which the activists’ willing-
ness to bet their assets, subject to ultimate judgment by the institutions, 
revalues the institutions’ governance rights, and thus makes governance 
markets more complete.  
I. THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION:  
FROM CAPITAL MARKETS TO GOVERNANCE 
Changes in the capital markets drive the efficient structure of 
corporate governance, not the other way around. Companies need risk 
capital to take advantage of new opportunities and to capture economies 
of scale and scope. Public investors who can diversify their shareholdings 
are the cheapest risk bearers. Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen made 
the point explicitly thirty years ago: “Common stock allows residual risk 
to be spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the 
extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations 
offering such claims.”16 Since diversified shareholders do not bear un-
systematic risk, they need not be paid to bear it.17 The result is a lower 
                                                                                                                 
15. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing U.K., E.U., and Israeli 
proposals).  
16. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 
J.L. & Econ. 327, 329 (1983). 
17. Standard portfolio theory decomposes risk into two categories: systematic risk 
and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is that which all companies are exposed to—for 
example, changes in gross domestic product (GDP) and interest rates. Systematic risk 
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cost of capital. But this cheap risk bearing comes in tandem with the 
expense of agency costs; someone else must manage the capital provided 
by dispersed shareholders. The result is dual specialization—investors in 
risk bearing and managers in managing—made possible by public capital 
markets. Agency costs resulting from the divergence of interests between 
professional managers and diversified shareholders are simply the 
reciprocal of the benefits of specialization.18  
The laser-like focus of corporate governance reformers on minimiz-
ing agency costs, starting at least with Jensen and Meckling’s classic 1976 
article,19 is premised on the proposition that diversified shareholders are 
the cheapest risk bearers, conditional on agency costs being effectively 
addressed.20 Put differently, the ability to diversify gives rise both to a 
demand for governance and, in turn, to its supply.21 Thus, when innova-
                                                                                                                 
cannot be eliminated by diversification. Unsystematic risk is that which relates to a 
particular company and can be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. See Richard 
A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 168–70 
(10th ed. 2011).  
18. See Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 112–16 (discussing “divergence of interest 
between ownership and control”). The text somewhat reframes the point Berle and Means 
were actually making. The separation of ownership and control, however efficient, in their 
view resulted in corporations run by managers and accountable to no one. Id. The agency 
problem served as a justification for New Deal efforts to empower regulators to hold 
managers accountable for their actions. 
19. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). 
20. Jensen and Meckling left open the possibility that changes in capital market 
technology would alter the tradeoff between ownership concentration (lower agency 
costs) and risk diversification. Id. at 319–23, 353–54. 
21. This framing raises an example of the causation question given prominence by 
the law and finance literature, which argues that governance protection of shareholders is 
necessary for the emergence of diversified shareholders. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 15–16 (2000) (examining literature arguing 
“investor protection encourages the development of financial markets”). We note that the 
historical evidence supports the direction of causation described in the text: from capital 
markets to governance, not from governance to capital markets. For the United Kingdom, 
see Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and 
Control: The British Experience, 46 Bus. Hist. 256, 275 (2004) (“The experience in the 
UK correspondingly indicates that buoyant [capital] market conditions can provide a 
hospitable milieu for transformative merger activity . . . .”); Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & 
Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in 
the United Kingdom, in A History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family 
Business Groups to Professional Managers 581, 593–97 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) 
(arguing “main cause” of decline in family ownership and rise of dispersed ownership was 
equity issuance to outside shareholders, thereby diluting insider shareholdings). For 
Germany, see Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, The Origins of the 
German Corporation—Finance, Ownership and Control, 10 Rev. Fin. 537, 539 (2006) 
(noting “existing measures of investor protection” do not explain “the high level of stock 
market activity at the beginning of the 20th century” in Germany). For the United States, 
see generally Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance (1994) (arguing populist politics created demand for 
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tion in the capital markets increases the range of instruments by which 
risk can be transferred, governance techniques develop to support them.  
Consider the following examples. The development of junk bonds in 
the 1970s, initially used in the finance of noninvestment grade 
companies, grew into a technique for financing hostile takeovers that 
greatly expanded the potential targets of a hostile bid. Noninvestment 
grade bond issuance rose in volume from less than 0.1% of total stock 
market capitalization in 1977 to a high of 1.5% in 1986.22 By the mid- to 
late 1980s, more than half of all junk bond issuances were related to 
acquisitions.23 In 1988, for example, an amount equal to 1.25% of total 
stock market capitalization was available to noninvestment grade issuers 
to fund takeovers.24 In turn, the public issuance of subordinated debt 
could support large amounts of mezzanine financing by bank consortia, 
thereby substantially leveraging the resources of the junk bond market. 
Nearly 23% of all major U.S. public companies were the object of a 
hostile takeover during the period between 1982 and 1989, and 57% re-
ceived a takeover bid of some kind.25 The next thirty years of corporate 
governance debate over the allocation of governance responsibilities for 
hostile takeovers was then driven by these capital market developments.26 
The growth in the completeness of the debt market also gave rise to 
a strong claim concerning a new form of governance. In 1989, Michael 
Jensen argued that the leveraged buyout (LBO) association, in his view a 
more efficient form of organizing capital and managing a business, 
would come to supplant the Berle-Means corporation with its widely dis-
tributed shareholders and powerful managers who did not hold a signifi-
cant equity stake in the organization.27  
In 2008, Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead made a similar 
connection between the completeness of the capital markets and 
corporate governance. They argued that the development of risk 
                                                                                                                 
investor protection in United States); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed 
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 
111 Yale L.J. 1, 80 (2001) (arguing based on U.S. experience that “the cause and effect 
sequence posited by the LLS&V thesis may in effect read history backwards”).  
22. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger 
Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 
2001, at 121, 126 fig.5. 
23. Id. at 125. 
24. Id. at 126 fig.5.  
25. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on 
Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. Fin. Econ. 193, 199 tbl.2 (1996). 
26. See Ronald J. Gilson, Catalysing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the 
United States System in the 1980s and 1990s, 24 Company & Sec. L.J. 143, 150–51 (2006) 
(arguing changes in U.S. capital markets, notably access to increased funds through junk 
bond market, created “the market for corporate control” for “a wide range of major . . . 
corporations”). 
27. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct. 
1989, at 61, 64–66. 
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management—the transfer of risk in slices rather than through all-
purpose risk bearing by common stockholders28—could substitute for 
traditional common stock-based risk capital, with important implications 
for the governance structure that supported risk transfer.29 The reduc-
tion in the centrality of common stock, which is a result of the higher 
leverage that risk management allows, in turn facilitates the reemergence 
of block positions and a change in control patterns.30 
A final example of the link between capital market innovation and 
governance structure concerns the relationship between stock market 
informational efficiency and the role of independent directors. Jeffrey 
Gordon has shown that the capital markets’ evolving informational effi-
ciency facilitated the greatly expanded role of independent directors in 
corporate governance.31 Independent directors provide a buffer between 
corporate management and the capital markets, which allows courts to 
rely on the directors’ assessments of how best to create value rather than 
the courts having to make that assessment themselves.32 That stock prices 
impound the public information about a corporation’s current and 
future performance allows directors plausibly to discharge the function 
courts assigns them.33 Again, the capital market’s evolving capacity drives 
innovation in governance structures. 
We offer these examples simply as evidence that corporate govern-
ance functions to support the transfer of risk to investors and is driven by 
the instruments that financial innovation makes available through the 
capital markets. Innovation in the capital markets determines the effi-
                                                                                                                 
28. See Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 
350, 366 (1998) (“Equity is a risk-management device. It is an ‘all-purpose’ risk cushion.”). 
29. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public 
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231, 263 
(2008) (“Risk management at the firm level . . . may be more efficient than risk bearing by 
diversified shareholders . . . .”). Identifying the particular scholarly contributions that 
developed this analysis is merely illustrative and therefore somewhat arbitrary. Gilson and 
Whitehead, for example, drew explicitly on Myron Scholes’ 1995 prediction that firms 
would come to substitute less costly derivatives for equity capital. Myron S. Scholes, The 
Future of Futures, in Risk Management: Problems and Solutions 349, 362–65 (William H. 
Beaver & George Parker eds., 1995). 
30 . Gilson and Whitehead argue that the development of risk management 
techniques completed the capital market infrastructure necessary to support Jensen’s 
argument that the LBO association could substitute for public ownership and could 
explain the phenomenon of one private equity firm selling a portfolio company to 
another private equity firm. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 251–53. 
31. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1541–61 
(2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Independent Directors]. 
32. See id. at 1523–26 (noting, with rise of independent directors in 1980s, Delaware 
courts developed strategy to focus on independent directors’ “role in reviewing and 
approving the defensive undertaking”). 
33. See id. at 1541–61 (“As stock prices become more informative, the directors’ 
monitoring role increasingly consists of using stock price metrics to measure the firm’s 
performance over time and against relevant intra-industry comparisons.”). 
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cient structure of corporate governance; the manner in which risk is 
transferred and the corresponding governance structure that supports 
that transfer depend on capital market evolution. Frictions and 
anomalies arise because the capital markets evolve at a faster rate than 
governance structures adapt; path-dependent institutions move less 
quickly than markets, in no small part because adaptation negatively 
affects those favored by existing patterns. 
A range of implications flows from the recognition that the efficient 
structure of corporate governance is driven by capital market evolution, 
whether as a result of financial innovation or of political economy.34 
These include, for example, the risk that best practice codes—including 
those of institutional investors like California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and guidelines by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), which are necessarily based on where the 
capital markets have been rather than where they are going—will result 
in the petrification of the governance process.35 Similarly, that capital 
market evolution drives corporate governance implies that ownership 
structures may become more concentrated, with significant 
blockholdings, even in countries with strong shareholder protection, as 
the continued development of derivative markets permits risk transfer in 
ways that move equity in the direction of an incentive contract most 
efficiently held by managers.36  
                                                                                                                 
34. Thus, for our purposes, we need not address the right combination of financial 
innovation that makes the capital markets more complete and thereby increases the set of 
available risk transfer mechanisms, and the political forces that serve to limit them. 
Importantly, the combination that shaped the path dependency in different countries 
reflects the influence of local conditions. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate 
Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 
327, 329–39 (1996) (explaining link between corporate governance and path dependency, 
and between governance institutions and industrial organization in United States, Japan, 
and Germany); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 356–57 (2001) (surveying different 
circumstances of corporate governance convergence and concluding “there can be no 
general prediction of the mode that convergence of . . . institutions may take”). 
35. Dani Rodrik makes the same point about the best practice codes of institutions, 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with respect to recommended 
institutional structures to support economic growth in the developing world. Dani Rodrik, 
Second-Best Institutions, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 104 (2008). The OECD, which has 
promulgated influential corporate governance standards, recognizes the impact of 
changes in the capital markets on efficient corporate governance practices. As background 
to an anticipated review of its standards, the OECD is undertaking an inventory of such 
changes, including changes in ownership patterns. See Mats Isaksson & Serdar Celik, 
Corporate Governance in Current Equity Markets: A Report to the OECD Project on 
Corporate Governance, Value Creation and Growth 7–8 (Nov. 7, 2012) (unpublished 
working paper) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing effort). 
36. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 252. For example, if the firm can hedge 
the systematic risk associated with a critical input—oil, for example—then managers can 
bear more firm-specific risk, an arrangement that more closely ties their payoff to matters 
under their control.  
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We focus on an important current manifestation of this dynamic: the 
reconceptualization of the value of governance rights and the role of 
activist shareholders in the face of capital markets that have come to be 
dominated by institutional investors acting as investment intermediaries. 
The next Part takes up the reconcentration of shareholdings that gave 
rise to agency capitalism and then to activist shareholders. 
II. THE RECONCENTRATION OF RECORD OWNERSHIP  
AND THE RISE OF AGENCY CAPITALISM 
In recent years, the centrality of the Berle-Means description of the 
distribution of U.S. stockholdings to the corporate governance debate 
has been attacked from two opposite directions. From one direction, 
critics who start from the Berle-Means account of U.S. equity holdings 
have pointed out that the United States and the United Kingdom are 
unique. Widely distributed equity holdings are neither typical of the rest 
of the world nor even necessarily the direction in which capital market 
evolution will lead. Everywhere else in the world, including both de-
veloped and developing countries, equity ownership of public corpora-
tions is characterized by controlling shareholders or blockholders.37 
A more direct challenge comes from the opposite direction: The 
Berle-Means description of the distribution of U.S. equity ownership 
simply is no longer correct. In 1950, the Berle-Means description 
advanced some twenty years earlier remained accurate. Equities were still 
held predominately by households; institutional investors, including 
pension funds, held only approximately 6.1% of U.S. equities.38 By 1980, 
however, the distribution of shareholdings had begun to shift away from 
households toward institutions. At that time, institutional investors held 
28.4% of U.S. equities.39 By 2009, institutional investors held 50.6% of all 
U.S. public equities, and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S. 
corporations.40 Table 1 sets out the institutional ownership of different-
size cohorts of U.S. public corporations in 2009. 
                                                                                                                 
37. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1645–50 (2006) 
(summarizing relevant literature); Holderness, supra note 1, at 1395 tbl.4 (providing more 
recent data and comparing block ownership in U.S. and non-U.S. firms); Isaksson & Celik, 
supra note 35, at 15 (showing share of global capitalization of stock markets in countries 
with dispersed ownership has dropped by some 30% between 2000 and 2011).  
38. Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rabimov, The Conference Bd., Inc., The 2010 
Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition 22 
tbl.10 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. For a time series of institutional ownership between 1950 and 2004, see 
Gordon, Independent Directors, supra note 31, at 1568 tbl.4 & fig.6. For similar 
observations, see, e.g., Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Activism in the United States, 19 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 55, 57 fig.1 (2007).  
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TABLE 1: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP OF LARGEST  
U.S. CORPORATIONS IN 200941 
Corporations Ranked by Size Average Institutional Holdings 
Top 50 63.7% 
Top 100 66.9% 
Top 250 69.3% 
Top 500 72.8% 
Top 750 73.9% 
Top 1000 73.0% 
Thus, for the largest U.S. corporations, institutions control the great 
majority of outstanding shares. Put graphically but not metaphorically, 
representatives of institutions that collectively represent effective control 
of many large U.S. corporations could fit around a boardroom table. For 
example, Table 2 sets out the percentage of the outstanding stock held in 
2009 by the twenty-five largest institutions in the ten largest U.S. corpora-
tions in which there was not a controlling owner. 
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF OUTSTANDING STOCK IN TEN LARGEST U.S. 
CORPORATIONS WITHOUT A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER HELD BY 
TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST INSTITUTIONS IN 200942 
Corporation  
(in order of market value) 
Percentage of Stock Held  
by Twenty-Five Largest Institutions 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 25.0% 
Microsoft Corp. 31.9% 
Apple Inc. 37.0% 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 17.2% 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 19.2% 
General Electric Co. 24.8% 
Procter & Gamble Co. 29.1% 
Bank of America Corp. 28.9% 
Google Inc. 44.1% 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 35.8% 
To be sure, the enormous growth in institutional holdings of U.S. 
equities and the corresponding increase in ownership concentration are 
                                                                                                                 
41. Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 27 tbl.13. 
42. Id. at 30–34. 
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quite different from the control or blockholdings observed elsewhere in 
the world. In their own way, U.S. institutions, like Berle-Means diversified 
individual investors, are themselves passive with respect to much of 
corporate governance despite the fact that they confront much lower 
coordination and other collective action costs than individual investors 
do. We will argue that the distribution of shareholdings in the United 
States remains unique, no longer because of its great breadth, but 
because of the particular structure of the concentrated institutional 
ownership that has developed. Real blockholders are not insignificant in 
the United States;43 however, the central change in equity distribution 
has been for equity ownership to concentrate in intermediary institu-
tions, like pension funds and mutual funds, that are the record holders 
of equity on behalf of their beneficiaries, mutual fund shareholders, or 
pension retirees.44  
This Part explores the impact on corporate governance of the 
changes in the capital markets that have led to a pattern of U.S. equity 
holdings that we call “agency capitalism.” By this we mean that the 
beneficial owners of U.S. equity confront two agency relationships: 
between the portfolio company management and the institutional record 
holder and then between the record holder and the beneficial owner. 
This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. While academics and the courts 
have explored the management-shareholder agency relationship in great 
depth, the institutional agency relationship has received far less atten-
tion.45  
                                                                                                                 
43. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 1, at 1378 (“Ninety-six percent of thesefirms 
have shareholders who own at least 5% of thefirm’s common stock (‘blockholders’). 
Three times as many firms have majority blockholders as have no blockholders. 
Blockholders on average own 39% of a firm.”). 
44. We distinguish this concentration from the nominal concentration that occurs 
when record ownership is in “street name” or “nominee name,” even in the circumstances 
in which brokers have commonly voted the shares held by beneficial owners. In the street 
name setup, the retail owner can always claim voting rights,, and even before the recent 
limits on broker voting, various notification systems mandated by the proxy rules 
facilitated such voting pass-throughs. The retail investor could also assert control over the 
disposition of portfolio securities. By contrast, in reconcentration through investment 
intermediaries, the retail investor has, in effect, an undivided interest in the pool of 
securities with no way of reclaiming any share of voting rights for any portfolio company. 
Nor can a retail investor affect the composition of the portfolio. 
45. A developing literature examines the extent to which recommendations by ISS 
and other advisory services influence mutual fund voting. See, e.g., Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. 
Garner & Ralph A. Walking, Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389, 2401 (2009) (noting 
negative ISS recommendation unexplained by firm performance or governance 
characteristics reduces director votes by 20.7% on average); Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & 
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869, 906 
(2010) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Proxy Advisors] (“[W]e find that the impact of 
an ISS recommendation ranges from 6% to 13% for the median company.”); James 
Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting 
on Proxy Proposals, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2010) (“[M]utual funds voted in line with ISS 
recommendations much more frequently than with contrary management 
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We argue that changes in the capital markets, especially in the 
manner in which retirement savings are channeled, have led to a signifi-
cant change in ownership distribution and complementary changes in 
corporate governance. In particular, the intermediary institutions’ 
business model and their corresponding expertise define and limit the 
role they play in corporate governance. Part III develops how these limits 
result in a general undervaluation by the market of governance rights. 
Part IV in turn frames an important role for activist investors. As govern-
ance intermediaries or governance arbitrageurs, activist shareholders 
can, in the right circumstances, serve to reduce the market’s undervalua-
tion of governance rights to the advantage of all shareholders.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
recommendations.”). All report measurable but limited influence. Assessing the influence 
of proxy advisors is beyond the ambition of this Article. For further discussion, see Angela 
Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. Corp. 
Fin. 914, 927 (2011) (finding “funds tend to support proposals which are likely to 
positively impact shareholder wealth” and “fund approval rates have a significant impact 
on whether a proposal is ultimately passed by shareholders and whether management 
implements that proposal”); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual 
Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 846 (2009) 
(“[T]he greater the dependency of [mutual funds] upon [corporate clients] for asset 
management business, the less likely the fund family will be [able] to support shareholder-
sponsored governance resolutions.”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Voting 
Through Agents: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections 12–18 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-28, 2011) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan, 
Voting Through Agents], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912772 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (considering various ways that mutual funds economize on voting 
costs). 
Other literature examines whether forcing institutional investors to reveal their 
governance decisions, at least as expressed through voting, changes behavior. See, e.g., 
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on 
Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule, 13 
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 220, 265 (2011) (finding evidence that mutual funds’ proxy votes in 
support of management did not decline after SEC implemented vote disclosure rule); 
Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on 
Corporate Governance, 1 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 157, 171 (2006) (providing empirical evidence 
that mutual funds “voted in general accordance with the policies they laid out in [the] 
proxy policy disclosures” required by SEC). 
Prior discussions of the two-sided agency relationship similar to that in this Article 
can be found in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance After the Crisis 247–48 
(2012) (arguing deficiency in institutional monitoring “merely relocates [the] locus” of 
principal-agent problem); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional 
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1317–28 (1991) (explaining 
money managers show “limited interest in corporate governance issues . . . because the 
expected gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and received by 
investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and borne by money 
managers”); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from 
Control, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 877, 878–79 (2010) (noting financial intermediaries, like 
mutual funds and pension funds, “introduce the same separation of ownership from 
control” and themselves “function[] much like the Berle and Means corporation”). 
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A. Retirement Savings and the Rise of Institutional Ownership 
Post-World War II policy decisions concerning how retirement 
security would be provided were a major, if at the time unrecognized, 
cause of the rise of the U.S. system of agency capitalism.46 Three were of 
particular significance: the initial decision to rely primarily on privately 
funded pensions rather than to expand Social Security, the enactment of 
the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),47 
                                                                                                                 
46.  See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic 
Order, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1519, 1538–52 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, New Economic 
Order] (examining developments in stock market and pension funds); Martin Gelter, The 
Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy 3 (Fordham Law Legal Studies 
Research, Paper No. 2079607, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079607 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]hanges in the pension system helped to 
transform corporate governance into a system dominated by the shareholder interest and 
to edge out the managerial model.”). Peter Drucker recognized in the mid-1970s the 
increasing equity ownership by pension funds but greatly overestimated how active 
pension funds would be in corporate governance. Peter F. Drucker, The Unseen 
Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America 1 (1976) (noting in 1976 
American workers owned “more than one-third of the equity capital of American 
business”).  
47. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001–1461 (2006)); see also John H. Langbein, David A. Pratt & Susan J. Stabile, Pension 
and Employee Benefit Law 78–145 (5th ed. 2010) (surveying history and structure of 
ERISA); Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1541–44 (discussing passage of 
ERISA and defined benefit plans); Gelter, supra note 46, at 16–17 (same).  
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and the later shift in employer-provided pension plans from defined 
benefit to defined contribution plans.48  
The immediate post-war period saw a hotly contested debate over 
how to finance retirement security in the United States: Stated simply, 
would retirement support come primarily through private pension funds, 
or through an expansion of the government Social Security program?49 
Retirement assets that went into private pension funds could then be 
invested in the capital markets, including equities, as compared to taxes 
paid into the Social Security Trust Fund that have been invested in U.S. 
Treasury securities. Reliance on private pension plans carried the day; 
substantial tax incentives encouraged workers and employers to look to 
such plans as the major source of their retirement savings despite some 
increase in Social Security benefit levels. 
The 1974 passage of ERISA augmented the impact on equity owner-
ship of the private provision of retirement security, which resulted in a 
further increase in funds available to the capital markets. Responding to 
abuses in the management and funding of private pension funds, 
Congress enacted legislation that requires companies to set up special 
entities to hold pension resources that are governed by trustees having 
fiduciary duties solely to their beneficiaries. Most importantly, ERISA 
requires that the defined benefit plans currently fund the actuarially 
determined annual payments necessary to pay future retirement obliga-
tions and pay down any prior unfunded past service costs over no more 
than thirty years.50 This requirement resulted from the discovery that 
many corporations had allowed a substantial build-up of unfunded past 
service costs.51 Pension funds covering public employees, although not 
covered by ERISA, followed suit. The result was an enormous concentra-
                                                                                                                 
48. The rise of institutional owners is also intertwined with the modern under-
standings of the value of portfolio diversification. See infra Part II.B (discussing triumph 
of modern portfolio theory).  
49. See, e.g., William Graebner, A History of Retirement 215–41 (1980) (tracing 
legislative, economic, and social factors that encouraged development of private pension 
funds from World War II through 1950s); Alicia H. Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: 
The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Pensions and Retirement Income 359, 362–63 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Oxford Handbook] (“[A]fter the Second World War business and labor had 
to re-create . . . the [employer-sponsored] pension system.”); Steven Sass, The 
Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to 
1980, in Oxford Handbook, supra, at 76, 78, 83 (“The alternative postwar approach to the 
old-age income problem, adopted by Anglo-Saxon nations such as the United States . . . 
relied on an expansion of employer plans.”). 
50 . See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2006) (setting forth minimum vesting 
requirements for defined benefit plans); Employee Retirement Income and Security Act 
of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (same); id. §§ 301–308 (providing for minimum 
funding standards); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale 
L.J. 451, 475–78 (2004) (summarizing impact of ERISA on defined benefit plans). 
51. See Eric D. Chason, Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 519, 
536–43 (2007) (reviewing ERISA funding requirements). 
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tion of funds that would be invested in the capital markets. From 1980 to 
1990, pension fund assets increased from $871 billion to $3.02 trillion.52  
The impact of this increase on retirement fund assets appears clearly 
through comparison with, for example, the typical unfunded German 
pension funds, whose commitment to make retirement payments is 
simply a promise not backed by dedicated assets.53 In effect, an unfunded 
pension fund is fully invested in the company’s unsecured debt. 54 
Although plainly unintentional, the U.S. requirement—that a pension 
promise must be supported by assets held in trust rather than by a book 
entry on a corporate balance sheet—both generated and concentrated 
very large amounts of funds that would be invested in the capital markets 
by a class of fiduciaries on behalf of future retirees.55 
The shift away from defined benefit retirement plans to defined 
contribution plans also expanded the role of intermediaries at the center 
                                                                                                                 
52. Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 25 tbl.12. 
53. See, e.g., Bert Rürup, The German Pension System: Status Quo and Reform 
Options, in Social Security Pension Reform in Europe 137, 138–43 (Martin Feldstein & 
Horst Siebert eds., 2002) (describing German pension funding). 
54. The European Union is currently considering a proposal that would require 
balance sheet disclosure of unfunded liabilities of employer liabilities under defined 
benefit pension plans. See Paul J. Davies, Fears Grow of £600bn Company Pension Bill, 
Fin. Times (London), Jan. 2, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d9fc7b0-3302-11e1-
a51e-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“UK companies will have 
to pump as much as £600bn ($930bn) into their corporate pension schemes under a 
revamp of pensions regulation being considered in Europe . . . .”); see also European Ins. 
& Occupational Pensions Auth., Response to Call for Advice on the Review of Directive 
2003/41/EC: Second Consultation 74–85 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at https:// 
eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/consultations/consultationpapers/CP06-11/Cf
A-1-23-draft_advice_for_consultation_EIOPA-CP-11-006_.doc (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (considering “holistic balance sheet” approach “to record and measure on a 
consistent basis the obligations and resources” of pension funds).  
U.S. accounting rules have required such balance sheet disclosure since 1985, 
another factor that burdened the use of defined benefit plans. See Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87: Employers’ 
Accounting for Pensions para. 35, at 15 (1985), available at http://www.amac.org.mx/pag
s/pdf/fas87.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (requiring “unfunded accrued 
pension cost” to be recognized as liability “if net periodic pension cost recognized 
pursuant to this Statement exceeds amounts the employer has contributed to the plan”); 
see also Robert M. Harper, Jr. & Jerry R. Strawser, The Effect of SFAS 87 on Corporate 
Funding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 20 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 815, 815–16 (1993) 
(discussing requirements under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87). 
55. This concentration of votes had an important role in hostile takeover fights. The 
fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees under ERISA require trustees to vote on the 
shares of the employer held by the plan solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, which 
do not include the interests of future employees in the target company. The result is to 
force the trustees, typically appointed by the target employer, to consider only the price 
offered in making a decision whether to tender. See Armin G. Brecher, Simon Lazarus III 
& William A. Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement Plans as an Impediment to 
Takeovers, 38 Bus. Law. 503 (1983) (surveying voting obligations of plan trustees in 
takeovers); Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not 
Always Better, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 61, 93–97 (1998) (same). 
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of an agency capitalism regime. Again, the motivation for the switch was 
past service costs. The annual amount that an employer has to deposit in 
a defined benefit plan depends importantly on the investment return the 
fund can be expected to earn. A higher-assumed return results in smaller 
current payments. A defined benefit plan commits the company to 
providing employees with a specified retirement payment, typically a 
percentage of their salary measured over a specified period, multiplied 
by the employee’s years of employment with the plan sponsor.56 This 
arrangement places all of the investment risk on the company; if overly 
optimistic predicted investment returns prove too high, so that the fund 
has too few assets to make expected retirement payments, the company, 
if solvent, must make up the shortfall. Consistent with that allocation of 
risk, the trustees of the pension funds, who are appointed by the 
company, control the fund’s investment decisions.  
A defined contribution plan, on the other hand, shifts the invest-
ment risk from the retirement fund sponsor to the employee. This pre-
vents the employer from getting in trouble as a result of the unfortunate 
alignment of incentives that favor optimistic predictions of investment 
returns and a lower current payment to the pension fund (and therefore 
increased reported earnings). Under a defined contribution plan, the 
sponsor makes a specified annual contribution to the employee’s 
account, which the employee then decides how to invest. The savings 
available on the employee’s retirement then depend entirely on the 
success of the employee’s investment decisions, with the result that 
employers (and their balance sheets) do not bear the liability for future 
investment performance.57 Most commonly, the employee is given a 
choice of investment options determined by the pension plan. Increas-
ingly, these choices are largely mutual funds, reflecting the employees’ 
need for investment management advice.58  
                                                                                                                 
56. See, e.g., Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1541–42 (explaining 
operation of defined benefit plan); Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 455–56 (same). 
57. Edward Zelinsky describes how the shift from a defined benefit to a defined 
contribution plan transfers to the employee the risks that investments will earn too little to 
support retirement, that contributions to the plan actually will be made, and that the 
employee will outlive his income. Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 458–68. 
It was an odd policy choice to shift the investment risk from the employer, who 
presumably was a more sophisticated investor (or had access to sophisticated investment 
advice) and could secure economies of scale in managing that risk, to employees who 
could be expected neither to be sophisticated themselves nor to have access to the same 
quality of advice as would the employer. This shift has also been lamented on 
distributional grounds. See Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1546. 
Defined benefit plan payouts were geared to an employee’s final wage, which would be 
increasing with the firm’s success and the employee’s experience. Defined contribution 
plan payouts are less sensitive to final wages and are reduced by employees’ investment 
conservatism.  
58. Various factors push employers to move from a defined benefit to a defined 
contribution plan. See Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 475 (summarizing these factors); see 
also Gelter, supra note 46, at 16–20 (explaining reasons for this shift). 
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The result has been a significant shift from defined benefit pension 
plans to defined contribution pension plans. In 1990, defined contribu-
tion plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) totaled $1.5 
trillion, and private defined benefit plans approximately $1.6 trillion. 
Almost all of the subsequent growth in retirement assets took place in 
defined contribution plans and IRAs ($9.2 trillion in total by 2010), 
rather than in private defined benefit plans ($2.2 trillion by 2010).59 
Figure 2 shows the change in the number of defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans (as opposed to assets held) over the period from 1975 
through 2007. Figure 3 shows the change in the number of participants 
in each kind of plan. While the number of defined benefit plan partici-
pants has remained flat, the number of defined contribution plan partici-
pants has steadily risen over the same period.  
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF PRIVATE-SECTOR QUALIFIED DEFINED BENEFIT 
AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 1975–200760 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
59. Inv. Co. Inst., 2011 Investment Company Fact Book 101 fig.7.2, 102 (2011), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 25 tbl.12; Gelter, supra note 46, at 13 fig.3. 
This shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans is also gaining 
strength in the United Kingdom. See Norma Cohen, Final-Salary Pensions Being Closed 
Rapidly, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 15, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a35042ae-
2667-11e1-85fb-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
60. Emp. Benefit Research Inst., EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits ch. 10 
tbls.10.2a & 10.2b (2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/data
book/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF PRIVATE-SECTOR QUALIFIED DEFINED BENEFIT AND 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARTICIPANTS, 1975–200761 
 
For our purposes, this increase and concentration of financial power 
had two important consequences. First, it created a source of funds that 
could be deployed to fund large investments and still allow investors to 
retain a diversified portfolio.62 For example, mutual funds in 2011 held 
approximately 49.8% ($4.68 trillion) of defined contribution plans and 
                                                                                                                 
61. Id. 
62. This growth was facilitated by a final regulation issued in 1979 by the Department 
of Labor, the government agency charged with overseeing pension fund investments, 
which stated that the suitability of a particular investment would be judged not in 
isolation, but as a part of the pension fund’s entire portfolio. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2) 
(2012) (requiring fiduciary of employee benefit plan to give “appropriate consideration” 
to “[t]he composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification” in discharging 
fiduciary duties). The official commentary accompanying the regulation effectively 
endorsed the portfolio approach:  
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a 
specific investment or investment course of action does not render such 
investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or per se 
imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be 
judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment 
course of action plays within the overall plan portfolio.  
Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Investment of Plan Assets Under the 
“Prudence” Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979).  
Since prudence would be determined at the portfolio level, pension funds could 
make individually risky investments, like limited partnership interests in private equity 
funds involved in leveraged takeovers. For general background on the new investment 
standard, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent 
Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52 (1987). 
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IRA assets,63 of which approximately 40.8% ($1.91 trillion) were invested 
in U.S. equities.64 Second, decisionmaking over these concentrated funds 
was centralized in a small number of individuals and institutions that 
were obligated to consider only the best interests of the future retirees. 
Again, to use mutual funds as an example, the five largest U.S. mutual 
fund groups in 2005 controlled approximately 37% of total assets 
invested in mutual funds, the largest ten controlled approximately 48%, 
and the largest twenty-five controlled approximately 71%.65  
B. The Triumph of Portfolio Theory  
The past thirty-five years have seen a sharp increase in U.S. 
household ownership of equities, but equity mutual funds have been the 
vehicle. As of 1977, approximately 20% of households owned equities 
directly. While the percentage of direct owners has remained stable, the 
rise in mutual fund investment has increased the percentage of 
households that own equities directly or through mutual funds by 30% to 
a total of 50%.66 The increase in household mutual fund ownership has 
been significantly advanced by the portfolio theory of diversified 
investing. To be sure, a large fraction of mutual fund owners have come 
to this form of investment through employer-sponsored defined 
contribution accounts (in 2011, 32% of all households owned funds only 
through an employer-sponsored retirement plan), but a significant 
fraction owned mutual funds even without that connection (31% of 
mutual fund holders, or 13% of all households, owned funds only 
outside an employer-sponsored mutual fund plan). 67  Moreover, a 
                                                                                                                 
63. Inv. Co. Inst., 2012 Investment Company Fact Book 110 fig.7.5, 117 fig.7.12, 125 
fig.7.21 (2012) [hereinafter ICI, 2012 Fact Book], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/20
12_factbook.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
64. Id. at 125 fig.7.21. 
65. Inv. Co. Inst., Research Commentary: Competition in the Mutual Fund Business 2 
fig.2 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_competition.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
66. Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-
concentration in the United States, 5 Eur. Mgmt. Rev. 11, 15–16 (2008) (covering 1977–
2004 period). Current evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances is consistent with this trend. As of the 2010 Survey, approximately 15% of all 
families directly held stock; 9% directly held “pooled investment vehicles”; and 6% directly 
held “other managed assets.” Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 
2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 Fed. Res. Bull., June 
2012, at 1, 28 tbl.6, 34–35, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2012/pdf/scf12.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Yet the percentage of families 
with direct or indirect ownership of stock were approximately 50%, with indirect 
ownership primarily through tax-deferred retirement accounts, which heavily use mutual 
funds. Id. at 41. Of the total number of household equity holdings, only 32% were through 
direct stock ownership. The remainder took various collectively managed forms: 20% 
directly through pooled investment vehicles, 6% through other managed vehicles, and 
42% in tax-deferred retirement accounts. Id. at 42.  
67. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 91.  
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significant number of mutual fund holders (37%) hold mutual funds 
both inside an employer account and outside.68  
What led to this investment pattern? For greater equity investment, 
one important factor was the relative attractiveness of equity returns 
compared to returns on bank accounts, especially given the fixed interest 
rates that prevailed in the 1980s.69 But why did additional equity invest-
ment come through mutual fund investment during the period? 
Although mutual fund transaction fees declined, as reflected in the rise 
of no-load funds, so did the transaction costs of direct stock ownership 
with the end of fixed commissions in 1975.70 A recent cross-country study 
of eight advanced economies observes a trend of “shifting stock owner-
ship shares from households to financial institutions” and attributes this 
change to tax policies that favor such investing, for example, tax-favored 
retirement accounts.71 In the United States, tax-favored treatment of 
defined contribution plans has surely led to such indirect ownership. 
Households’ investment through 401(k) accounts, for example, is 
channeled into investment intermediaries. Yet as noted above, many 
investors own mutual funds outside of choice-constrained accounts.72 
Indeed, individual mutual fund ownership is commonly less tax-efficient 
than direct equity investing. Mutual funds are “flow-through” vehicles for 
tax purposes, and individuals are required to pay tax on net gains 
realized by the fund even when the fund is selling stock to meet others’ 
redemption requests.73  
A capital market innovation supplies the link: the application of 
Markowitz’s Nobel Prize-winning theory on the efficiency of mean-
variance investing, which gives rise to the portfolio theory.74 The lessons 
were (i) diversification improves risk-adjusted returns; (ii) the broader 
the portfolio, the greater the diversification; and (iii) since secondary 
markets in seasoned equities are highly efficient, research that adds value 
is expensive and its fixed cost is best spread across large portfolios. All of 
this argues for investing through investment intermediaries that can 
                                                                                                                 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 66, at 15 (“[B]ank savings accounts lost their allure as 
the government-mandated cap on interest rates failed to keep pace with inflation.”). 
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1975) (prohibiting national securities exchanges and 
their members from “charg[ing] . . . any fixed rate of commission for transactions effected 
on . . . such exchange”). 
71. Kristian Rydqvist, Joshua Spizman & Ilya Strebulaev, The Evolution of Aggregate 
Stock Ownership 2, 36–37 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/57351/1/66759728X.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
73. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 
139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 1478–83 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Elements] (surveying 
regulation and taxation of mutual funds). 
74. Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments 3 
(1959); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77, 77 (1952).  
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assemble diversified portfolios as the low-cost way to follow this strategy. 
Index investing is the limit,75 but the debate over whether households 
should exclusively invest through such lowest-cost vehicles may obscure 
the major change, which is that households increasingly invest through 
diversification-providing intermediaries, mutual funds. 
C. The Reconcentration of Ownership 
The peculiar position of institutional investors in the reconcentra-
tion of ownership of U.S. public corporations can be seen most easily 
from the governance role played by mutual funds, both because of their 
size and homogeneity, and because of the extensive information that is 
available concerning their governance activities. Three characteristics are 
most telling: one with respect to power, one with respect to reticence, 
and one with respect to responsiveness. First, mutual funds are poten-
tially powerful: They hold a large percentage of U.S. equities. Over 
recent years, mutual funds held approximately 25% of the outstanding 
stock of publicly traded U.S. corporations.76 Given the concentration in 
the mutual fund industry,77 twenty-five mutual fund families hold the 
voting rights for some 18.75% of outstanding U.S. equities.78 Thus, by 
any measure, mutual funds have the power to be a significant force in the 
governance of large U.S. corporations.79 
                                                                                                                 
75. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment 
Law, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1, 1 (defining index investing as “creat[ing] and 
hold[ing] essentially unchanged a portfolio of securities that is designed to approximate 
some index of market performance such as the Standard & Poor’s 500”). 
76. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 12 fig.1.5, 102. 
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining concentration in mutual 
fund industry). 
78. The calculation is based on the following two facts. In 2011, the largest twenty-five 
mutual fund families represented 73% of mutual fund assets under management. ICI, 
2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 25. In total, mutual funds held approximately 25% of 
U.S. domestic equities. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 12 fig.1.5.  
79. In fact, it is likely that the discussion in the text quite significantly understates the 
voting power of the firms that advise mutual funds. The figures in the text reflect only the 
holdings of retail mutual funds, likely because the most available source of data on mutual 
fund holdings comes from the Investment Company Institute, whose data is limited to 
advisors registered as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
At the same time, the advisors to mutual funds also manage separate accounts for other 
institutional investors, like pension funds. These represent a very large concentration of 
assets. For example, of the $3.673 trillion assets under management by BlackRock, the 
largest asset manager in the United States, $1.045 trillion is in retail mutual funds and 
$1.483 trillion is in separate accounts managed for institutional investors. If overall mutual 
fund advisors manage in separate accounts as many assets as they do for mutual funds, and 
if the allocation to domestic equities is the same for separate accounts as it is for mutual 
funds, then the advisors control the voting of roughly twice the percentage of shares 
shown in the text. The breakdown of the character of BlackRock’s assets under 
management comes from self-reported data provided by BlackRock to eVestment. (The 
figures here are calculated by the authors based on proprietary data of eVestment.) 
eVestment, EVestment Report on Funds Under Management by Category 2011 (on file 
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Second, mutual funds are at least on the surface anything but 
proactive. For example, during the 2009 proxy season, the proxy state-
ments of Russell 3000 corporations contained 20,434 proposals to be 
voted upon by shareholders.80 Of these, shareholders proposed 646 
(3.2% of all proposals); the remainder were proposed by management.81 
In turn, during the 2007 to 2009 proxy seasons, mutual funds proposed 
only eighty-four (4.5% of all shareholder proposals).82 The last step in 
this analysis is the character of the proposals mutual funds did make: 
Sixty-seven (80% of all mutual fund proposals over the same period) con-
cerned social and environmental issues,83 presumably proposed by so-
called socially responsible funds. Thus, over the 2007 through 2009 
proxy seasons, mutual funds offered only seventeen (0.9%) shareholder 
proposals addressed to corporate governance or performance issues.84 To 
be sure, mutual funds may be proactive in less visible ways, quietly 
persuading portfolio companies to take desired actions with the threat of 
making a shareholder proposal in the background; however, given the 
limited voluntary action by companies on such matters as requiring a 
shareholder vote to adopt a poison pill, the magnitude of that effort at 
least strongly suggests that mutual funds are reluctant to undertake 
proactive engagement, whether openly or behind the scenes. 
Third, while mutual funds are not proactive, they are not passive in 
the Berle-Means sense: They very frequently oppose management on 
core corporate governance issues. The most extreme example concerns 
voting on antitakeover matters—poison pills and staggered boards—and 
illustrates the extent to which mutual funds vote against management 
recommendations when the issue is presented to them. Over the 2004 
and 2005 proxy seasons, mutual funds voted in favor of shareholder 
proposals to require shareholder approval before adopting a poison pill 
almost 80% of the time, and in favor of proposals to declassify the board 
of directors 90% of the time.85 The same results appear for the 2003 
through 2008 period: Mutual fund voting in favor of shareholder 
proposals to declassify the board reached 87.4%,86 and with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
with authors); see also eVestment, https://www.evestment.com/about/company (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (providing data and analytical 
tools to institutional investors). 
80. Inv. Co. Inst., Trends in Proxy Voting by Registered Investment Companies 2007–
2009, 16 Res. Persp., Nov. 2010, at 4 fig.1 [hereinafter ICI, Trends in Proxy Voting], 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per16-01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 8 fig.6. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Morgan et al., supra note 45, at 920 tbl.2. 
86. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 45, at 38. 
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shareholder proposals to require shareholder approval for a poison pill, 
68.4%.87  
D. The Puzzle of What to Do with Institutional Investors 
The reconcentration of ownership of U.S. equities in intermediary 
institutions has resulted in conflicting views of the corresponding govern-
ance structure. On the one hand, concentration of ownership holds out 
the possibility that the institutions will, like Pinocchio, come to act like 
real boys—like “real” owners (or “stewards” in the more polite vocabu-
lary)88 and actively supervise the performance of professional manage-
ment. This view is reflected in current discussions in, for example, the 
European Union, the United Kingdom, and Israel89 concerning how 
institutions can, and might be made to, play a more proactive role in 
corporate governance. On the other hand, institutions have continually 
failed to play this role; despite the urging of academics and regulators, 
they remain stubbornly responsive but not proactive.90 Capital market 
evolution thus has concentrated governance rights in fewer hands, which 
despite continual urging, conversely appear to have little interest in 
playing or capacity to play an active stewardship role in portfolio 
company governance. The next Part considers how the combination of 
agency capitalism and the complementary limitations of intermediary 
competence and incentives results in an undervaluation of governance 
rights.  
 
                                                                                                                 
87. Id. at 44 tbl.5A. The percentage given in the text is the weighted average of the 
mutual fund voting in favor of proposals supported by ISS (89.5%, 21,699 proposals) and 
those not supported (21.9%, 9,870 proposals). To look at another measure: “Withhold 
votes” for management’s director nominees have somewhat increased over the 2007 to 
2009 period because of concerns about executive compensation, although the overall level 
of support (approximately 90%) is still high. See ICI, Trends in Proxy Voting, supra note 
80, at 11–12 fig.8, 14.  
88. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing “stewardship” proposal in 
United Kingdom). 
89. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing U.K., E.U., and Israeli 
proposals). 
90 . For example, some twenty-two years ago, institutions were urged to help 
nominate a minority of directors who were both independent of management and 
dependent on shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the 
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 881–85 
(1991) (arguing current proposals on improving governance were limited because “they 
merely make outside directors independent of management, rather than dependent on 
shareholders,” and proposing creation of new position of “professional outside director” 
which would satisfy both criteria). The proposal still attracts comment but not action. See 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Directors Guild, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2009, at 
A19 (advocating proposal of “independent professional directors” after U.S. Treasury 
bailed out private corporations). 
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III. WHY INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP WILL UNDERVALUE THE VOTE AND 
CREATE NEW AGENCY COSTS 
As our analysis thus far has shown, the mechanisms of risk transfer 
and the resulting change in the distribution of ownership are driven by 
the evolution of capital markets or political economy factors like pension 
reform. The need to develop complementary corporate governance 
innovation follows. In the United States, institutional investors collec-
tively have become the majority owners of most large public firms.91 This 
is because of two sets of factors: public and private decisions over how 
best to mobilize and protect retirement savings,92 and private decisions in 
favor of a particular organizational form for investors to achieve diversi-
fied wealth management.93  
In theory such institutional ownership should mitigate the manage-
rial agency cost problems of the Berle-Means corporation. Fewer owners, 
larger positions, more sophistication—the combination should reduce 
coordination costs and spontaneously generate more active monitoring. 
Reality has fallen short, however, as demonstrated by Part II’s account of 
institutions’ peculiar form of passivity. Mutual funds and other for-profit 
investment managers are almost uniformly reticent—very rarely proactive 
but responsive to others’ proposals.94 Public funds are more likely to be 
proactive but largely limited to governance matters rather than firm 
strategy or implementation. 95  At most, institutions might engage in 
“governance activism,” not “performance activism.” 
One way to frame the question then is to ask why institutions place 
so little value on the vote that, despite their collective majority holdings, 
they largely choose to be responsive to the initiatives of others. More 
engaged firm-specific voting could reduce managerial slack at specific 
firms; perhaps, more grandly, it could improve performance across an 
entire portfolio and, in theory, enhance social welfare by improving 
resource allocation throughout the economy.  
What accounts for the missed gains that would come with the full 
exercise of governance rights? The answer, we think, stems from the 
agency costs of agency capitalism, rooted in the institutions’ desire to 
deliver competitively superior performance for their beneficiaries 
(pension funds) or shareholders (mutual funds) while minimizing costs. 
This competitive pressure will lead institutions to focus externally and 
                                                                                                                 
91. See supra Table 1 (showing institutional ownership of largest U.S. corporations in 
2009, ranging from 63.7% of top fifty corporations to 73% of top thousand). 
92. See supra Part II.A. 
93. See supra Part II.B. 
94. See supra Part II.C–D. 
95. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1057–62 (2007) (explaining how 
relatively low pay and incentives, political constraints, and conflicts of interest inhibit 
public funds from pursuing aggressive activist strategies). 
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internally on relative performance. Such performance metrics do not 
readily accommodate much shareholder activism, especially performance 
activism, even though it would be in the beneficiaries’ (shareholders’) 
interest for the institutions to pursue value generation in this way.  
Take first the case of mutual funds (including separate accounts 
managed by mutual fund advisors)96 and other private wealth managers. 
Fundamental analysis, which identifies poor governance that affects 
performance or a poor business strategy, has a dual use: It could be used 
as the premise for a shareholder intervention to improve the situation or 
to provide a trading opportunity. A successful intervention will produce 
benefits enjoyed by all shareholders, including the mutual fund’s 
competitors. But a shared gain, unlike the private gain of a successful 
trade, provides little competitive advantage to the proactive investment 
manager whose portfolio products and services are chosen in 
comparison to competitors offering similar products or services. In an 
environment in which fund managers are evaluated in relative terms, 
absolute performance will play a secondary role.97 Investment managers 
thus have little private incentive to address proactively strategy and 
performance problems at portfolio companies and therefore do not develop 
the expertise to engage in that activity, even if such activity would benefit their 
beneficiaries.98 This gap between the beneficiaries’ and the fund’s interests 
represents a particular kind of agency cost that is of special concern 
because it interacts with the more familiar species of agency cost: This 
agency cost locks in managerial slack at the portfolio companies. 
Together these are the “agency costs of agency capitalism.”99  
                                                                                                                 
96. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing share ownership of 
mutual funds). 
97. Absolute performance is not irrelevant, of course, since flows in and out of all 
funds are affected by general stock market trends, as demonstrated by large outflows from 
equity funds in the post-fall 2008 period. An individual fund has little influence over such 
secular trends. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (observing high correlation of 
stock price volatility following financial crisis). 
98. Investment companies are further constrained by the limit on the number of 
shares they can hold in a portfolio company. For example, pass-through taxation is 
available to mutual funds only if they do not hold more than 10% of the voting securities 
of a portfolio company. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
5b(1) (2006) (providing requirements for “diversified management company”); see also 
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (defining regulated investment companies); id. § 
11(c)(3) (exempting regulated investment companies from taxation on corporate 
income). In this respect, it is important to note that this restriction applies to individual 
mutual funds, rather than to entire fund families like Fidelity or Vanguard. From this 
point, however, things get complicated (or, perhaps, interesting). The Investment 
Company Act of 1940 does not recognize the existence of fund families, so the board of 
directors of a mutual fund owes duties only to the shareholders of a particular fund, 
undiluted by the interests of other funds within the fund family. This disconnect between 
the law and the organization of the industry has gone largely unexamined. 
99. Cf. Isaksson & Celik, supra note 35, at 31 (“[A] great majority of intermediary 
investors actually lack the incentives to exercise their ownership functions.”); Kay, The Kay 
Review, supra note 7, at 42 (“In the current market environment both analysis and 
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Take next the case of pension funds. Pension funds do not have to 
compete for funds because their beneficiaries are locked in—California 
public employees cannot opt out of CalPERS. Yet assuming these funds 
are acting in good faith, pension fund beneficiaries will be in roughly the 
same position as mutual fund shareholders. The pension fund trustees 
will be looking for internal or external portfolio managers who deliver 
superior relative returns at the lowest cost.100 And these agents will face 
the same strong disincentives to make governance investments that will 
not redound to their competitive advantage. In effect, the good-faith 
monitoring by investment intermediaries of the relative performance of 
their portfolio managers reinforces the agency costs of agency capitalism.  
We can now turn to our central claim: The agency costs of agency 
capitalism will result in the chronic undervaluation of governance rights. 
Effective use of governance rights requires firm-specific investigation and 
firm-specific activism, both of which are costly and will be undersupplied 
by institutional investors. 
 First, the logic of diversification cuts against governance activity. No 
single stock accounts (or, in the case of a mutual fund, can account) for 
a significant portion of either the fund’s portfolio or the outstanding 
stock of the portfolio company,101 so even highly successful interventions 
(say a 10% stock price improvement) will have so small an effect on 
portfolio returns that the opportunity cost of the capital expended might 
                                                                                                                 
engagement have something of the character of public goods—most of the benefits accrue 
to people who do not undertake them.”). Both reports note the tension between 
beneficiaries’ and institutions’ interests, but neither addresses the role of activist investors. 
Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act 
and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1, 8–12 (2010) (noting “separation of ownership 
from ownership” but focusing on share turnover rate and skeptical of role of activist hedge 
funds). 
100. A recent study of U.K. pension funds finds that “the vast majority” delegate 
investment management in a manner that will “predispose pension funds to give primary 
emphasis to fund investment performance rather than an engaged approach to 
ownership.” Anna Tilba & Terry McNulty, Engaged Versus Disengaged Ownership: The 
Case of Pension Funds in the UK, 21 Corp. Governance: Int’l Rev. 165, 166 (2013). In 
general pension funds have increasingly moved to a decentralized model, in which 
specialist managers are hired to pursue specific investment strategies. See David Blake et 
al., Decentralized Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry, J. Fin. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9–11), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.120
24 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing empirical evidence). 
101. See supra note 98 (noting 10% limit on percentage of shares mutual funds can 
hold in portfolio company). For a description of mutual fund diversification/anti-
concentration rules, enforced through both the 1940 Investment Company Act and 
contemporaneous tax legislation, see Roe, Political Elements, supra note 73. Roe argues 
that these requirements arose from characteristic efforts throughout U.S. history to limit 
the potential power of financial intermediaries. See id. at 1470–71. More recently, John 
Morley argues that mutual funds lobbied for these restrictions to “brand” themselves as 
passive, low-risk investors. John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment 
Management Regulation, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 341, 345 (2012). 
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well exceed the gains.102 This “no (or negative) effect” relative perfor-
mance problem is particularly evident in the maximally diversified 
portfolio of the index investor, but it will be an inhibitory factor for all 
diversified investors. Additionally, the success of governance intervention 
is probabilistic, both in terms of whether the objective is attained (e.g., 
board turnover or the sale of a division) and whether the performance 
effect will be positive. Yet the costs incurred will, with certainty, reduce 
the fund’s returns. A benefit-cost calculation typically will point to de 
minimis governance expenditures by the diversified intermediary institu-
tion.103 Further, even if the intervention is successful and cost-justified, it 
still may degrade relative performance. Start with an index fund. The 
gains will be enjoyed by all other index investors, except that the activist 
fund will have incurred costs that lower its net relative performance. 
Next take an actively managed fund. In order to benefit relatively, it must 
overweight a company it has identified as poorly managed. If it succeeds, 
it will earn some positive returns (net of costs) that may give it some edge 
relative to some of its competitors (especially those who underweighted 
the stock), but diversification limits the relative gains. On the other 
hand, if the initiative fails, it may be facing losses on its overweight 
holdings in a company it has credibly identified as poorly managed. 
These losses come on top of the costs for the campaign—not a very 
promising calculus. This begins to sound like a brief for the Wall Street 
Rule: If the issuer is badly run, sell the stock and fire the portfolio 
manager.104 
                                                                                                                 
102. As an example of the impact of these diversification/anticoncentration rules, 
imagine a governance intervention that increases the value of the portfolio company. The 
fund’s ability to benefit is limited both in the percentage of the company it may own (less 
than 10%) and the fraction that this investment may represent of the fund’s total 
portfolio. Assume a major position by the fund, 3% of total assets, that represents a 5% 
ownership interest in the portfolio company, and an intervention that results in a 10% 
gain in the portfolio company’s stock price. The gain in the fund’s assets will be 0.3% (a 
10% increase in a 3% position); 95% of the benefit from the fund’s actions goes to others, 
yet the fund may pay 100% of the costs, which will reduce its 0.3% gain. In such 
circumstances, the fund may be better off (meaning, will be more likely to increase assets 
under management and thus fees) by spending the cost of the governance intervention on 
marketing. In some cases, governance intervention may serve as marketing. See 
BlackRock, Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment at BlackRock: Annual 
Review 2011 (2011), available at http://www2.blackrock.com/content/groups/global/
documents/literature/1111157291.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing 
governance practices and policies in investment management company’s marketing 
material).  
103. On the cost constraints and other disincentives to institutional investor activism, 
see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 595–608 
(1990) (providing classic account of “institutional money manager incentives and conflicts 
of interest” and “evidence on how these conflicts alter patterns of voting and activism”); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 95, at 1047–70 (discussing incentives to monitor and conflicts 
of interest of mutual funds, hedge funds, and public pension funds).  
104. Robert Pozen, then a senior executive at Fidelity, made this point twenty years 
ago at a conference attended by the authors, whose focus was on encouraging institutional 
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Second, the institution’s internal mechanisms for monitoring 
portfolio performance, based on benchmarking or performance relative 
to peers, cut against activist exercise of governance rights. Keep in mind 
that this is not the result of institutions’ misunderstanding as to what 
investors actually want. For-profit institutions like mutual funds have 
learned that investors follow relative performance and direct assets 
accordingly. Pension funds also follow relative performance in selecting 
and monitoring portfolio managers, whether in-house or external. Such 
relative performance evaluation falls out of contemporary portfolio 
theory.105  Factors that ramify market wide—for example, the recent 
financial crisis, to pick an extreme example of a general phenomenon—
affect a portfolio “systematically.” Such risks are not readily diversifiable, 
if at all. Therefore, the performance question is comparative: Given the 
state of the economy, how does this portfolio compare to “unmanaged” 
portfolios in the same “space”? A portfolio manager can outperform by 
omitting or underweighting (relative to market capitalization) a stock 
from his or her otherwise diversified portfolio.  
This has implications for shareholder activism. The process by which 
the portfolio manager acquires and uses information is not focused on 
identifying opportunities when the activist exercise of governance rights 
can improve company strategy. The portfolio manager’s mission is to 
determine how the current stock price matches his or her best estimate 
of the future stock price; that judgment determines a decision to buy, 
sell, or hold. Information comes in continuously; the comparative evalua-
tion occurs continuously. A diagnostic thought process—what sort of 
shareholder intervention would improve performance—is simply a 
different inquiry. Next, assume that the portfolio manager decides that a 
portfolio company is underperforming. The most assured way to grab the 
value of that insight is selling the stock rather than incurring the costs 
and speculative future benefits of a shareholder intervention. That is, the 
fact of poor governance or poor management at a portfolio company 
may be an element in comparative evaluation, but the indicated action 
for the institution—but not its beneficiaries—may be to “sell,” not to 
“intervene.”  
Third, the institutions’ compensation structures have a complicated 
relationship to any form of shareholder activism. For mutual funds, the 
                                                                                                                 
investor governance action. If Fidelity found itself invested in a company that was badly 
managed, Pozen said, the portfolio manager had made a mistake. For Fidelity, the key was 
not to make the mistake in the first place. See Michael T. Jacobs, Break the Wall Street 
Rule: Outperform the Stock Market by Investing as an Owner 12 (1993) (describing “the 
Wall Street Rule” as “the common practice of selling your shares when you are dissatisfied 
with the performance of a company”). 
105. For a recent effort to incorporate the impact of fund flows as a result of relative 
performance on portfolio strategy, see Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, An Institutional 
Theory of Momentum and Reversal 2 (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305671 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
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Investment Advisers Act of 1940 sharply limits the compensation that a 
fund’s shareholders can pay—that is, the incentive structure of the fees 
that Fidelity mutual funds pay to Fidelity.106 It would be very difficult to 
reward a fund with an incentive-based fee tied directly or indirectly to the 
returns from a particular kind of investment management activity. On 
the other hand, superior relative performance is the major driver of a 
fund’s profitability. Superior performance draws new assets that can be 
charged a fixed fee (no incentives), yet the fund’s largely fixed invest-
ment costs mean that the fund’s profits sharply increase with fund size.107 
As a result, there is no special incentive for activism, meaning that no 
reason exists to devote internal resources to the activist use of govern-
ance rights as opposed to pursuing other ways that might improve 
portfolio performance. But there would be a powerful incentive to 
engage in activism if it delivered returns that would improve the relative 
performance of the fund. The dearth of this activity suggests that while 
potential gains from activism may exist—there is ample evidence of 
managerial slack—the institutional investor’s business model makes it an 
unlikely candidate to pursue those gains.  
Fourth, evaluation alternatives to benchmarking, based on 
“absolute” returns, may push portfolio managers even further away from 
the granular evaluation that maps onto firm-specific activism. This style 
of investment focuses on asset allocation and regards equities as merely 
one among many asset classes that a portfolio manager can draw from; it 
invites macro- rather than microanalysis. In environments of high macro-
economic uncertainty, this strategy may contribute to high correlation 
among stock price movements. The observed high correlations of the 
post-financial crisis period108 thus undercut the business case for institu-
tional activism. If firm-specific performance is submerged in general 
market movement, this will lower the expected returns to activism.  
Intermediary institutional investors, then, present a problem for 
corporate governance. This efficient risk transfer and management 
                                                                                                                 
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b) (2006) (allowing compensation based on performance 
of fund “averaged over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately 
with [its] investment performance . . . in relation to the investment record of an 
appropriate index of securities prices”); Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R. 
Blake, Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. Fin. 779, 780 (2003) (describing Investment 
Company Act’s constraints on mutual fund incentive fees, which require “fulcrum fee” 
arrangements that reward good performance and penalize bad performance 
symmetrically).  
107. That is, the decision costs associated with a particular portfolio investment are 
mostly fixed. Size determines the assets over which those costs will be distributed. As assets 
increase, costs as a percentage of assets and as a percentage of the management fee paid 
by the investor will decrease. The firm’s profit margins increase with size and so does its 
profitability.  
108. See Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and 
Share Price Unpredictability: Reasons and Implications 63 (Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding dramatic increase in firm-
specific volatility following all financial crises since early twentieth century). 
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structure—delivering low-cost, high-powered diversification and scale 
economies in active management—gives rise to significant problems in 
the efficient assignment of governance rights. As in the standard Berle-
Means analysis, beneficial owners are rationally passive; governance 
rights are of little value to them. Institutional owners who are not seeking 
private benefits of control are rationally reticent;109 they also will assign a 
low value to governance rights since their proactive exercise will not 
improve the relative performance on which the institutional investor’s 
profitability and ability to attract assets depends. As a result, institutions 
can be expected to be skilled at managing portfolios, not at developing 
more profitable alternatives to a portfolio company’s business strategy, 
creating better governance structures for the firm, or mastering the skills 
of governance activism. The institutions’ performance, and hence their 
success in attracting funds and earning profits, is evaluated by the perfor-
mance of their portfolios, measured in comparative terms. In light of the 
mismatch between skills and incentives with respect to active company 
management, as opposed to portfolio management, governance rights 
will be chronically undervalued.110  
Thus, we need to take seriously the governance environment created 
by the joint forces of capital market evolution and political economy, 
which at this moment can be described as “latent” activism (using 
Mancur Olson’s terminology to refer to voters that are susceptible to 
organization because of well-defined common interests but are passive 
because of mobilization costs), and look for useful adaptations.111 Costs, 
lack of expertise, and incentive conflicts reduce the value of governance 
rights in the hands of intermediary institutions.  
                                                                                                                 
109. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text (noting mutual funds are not 
proactive in governance issues but respond to activists’ governance proposals). 
110. This account of mutual funds’ (and similar intermediaries’) incentives provides 
a sounder basis for corporate governance theorizing than some recent models put forth in 
the finance literature. For a summary of this literature, see Amil Dasgupta & Giorgia 
Piacentino, The Wall Street Walk When Blockholders Compete for Flows 1–7 (June 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848001 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). For further discussion of our perspective on current finance 
scholarship on institutional investor selling behavior, see infra note 132. 
Gerald Davis has similarly observed the reconcentration of share ownership yet the 
passivity of institutional owners. Davis, supra note 66. His explanation is somewhat 
different (conflicts of interest) and somewhat complementary (relatively short holding 
periods). See id. at 19 (finding Fidelity and American Funds “routinely liquidate[] very 
large ownership positions”); id. at 20 (noting conflict of interest between investment 
management and pension businesses). Recent evidence on conflicts of interest is mixed. 
See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Voting Through Agents, supra note 45, at 6–7 (noting studies on 
mutual fund conflicts of interest “arrive at inconsistent results”). Relatively short holding 
periods are consistent with our account, in which institutional investors’ business model 
would lead to sales rather than governance activism at firms that institutions decide are 
mismanaged.  
111. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups 125–31 (1971). 
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IV. ACTIVISTS AS GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGEURS 
Investment intermediaries have arisen to facilitate the channeling of 
retirement savings into capital markets and to provide individuals with 
the advantages of diversified portfolios. These investment intermediaries 
specialize in managing risk, adding to and taking advantage of increasing 
capital market completeness. But this specialization, reinforced by the 
link between scale and profitability, may leave a governance gap, an 
embedded shortfall in the monitoring of managerial agency costs. 
Institutional investors have little appetite for an active governance role; 
in consequence, they are unlikely to have developed the additional skills 
suited to it. 
This gap, however, creates an arbitrage opportunity. Instead of push-
ing institutional investors into roles for which they may be unsuited, we 
should expect specialization. Addressing the governance gap—the 
agency costs of agency capitalism—plausibly requires a new set of actors 
to complement the diversified investment and portfolio optimization in 
which intermediary institutional investors now engage. Such actors would 
develop the skills to identify strategic and governance shortfalls with 
significant valuation consequences, to acquire a position in a company 
with governance-related underperformance, and then to present reticent 
institutions with their value proposition: a specified change in the 
portfolio company’s strategy or structure.  
Once the issue is framed and presented, the undervaluation of 
governance rights is reduced: The institutions will vote (or indicate 
willingness to vote) in favor of the specialized actors’ perspective if the 
issue is framed in a compelling way. We see such specialized actors in the 
capital markets—activist investors of various types—and indeed a compli-
cated interaction between the actors and the institutions has arisen 
whose shape has been described in a recent comprehensive study by 
Nickolay Gantchev of 1,164 activist campaigns over the 2000 to 2007 
period.112 It is interesting that the activists often achieve their stated 
objectives, but not invariably: They succeed in approximately 29% of the 
cases.113 As we elaborate below, an activist campaign is best seen as a 
multistep process, the outcome of which critically depends on the extent 
to which the activist can garner significant institutional support for the 
proposed actions. The public campaign is a backdrop to the behind-the-
scenes shareholder plebiscite. Shareholder activists make their strategic 
proffers; the relevant institutional investor constituency is willing to 
consider and assess them.  
                                                                                                                 
112. Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 610 (2013).  
113. Id. at 620 tbl.3 (finding highest success in pursuing sale or privatization of 
target, restructuring of inefficient operations, and additional disclosure, but less in 
obtaining higher dividends or repurchases, CEO removal, and executive compensation 
changes).  
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From our perspective, responsibility to beneficial owners for 
maximizing performance is split between specialists: Activist investors 
specialize in monitoring portfolio company strategy and formulating 
alternatives when appropriate for presentation to the institutional 
investors; in turn, institutional investors specialize in portfolio manage-
ment and in evaluating proposals presented by activist investors. This 
specialization is more efficient than having a single actor play both roles. 
Each requires a different business model, and combining them may 
degrade the performance of both.  
This specialization addresses both sides of the agency capitalism 
triangle depicted in Figure 1. Activist shareholders are not control-
seekers, in the sense that they are neither motivated by the pursuit of pri-
vate benefits of control, nor do they anticipate actually managing a 
portfolio company. Rather they are governance entrepreneurs, arbitrag-
ing governance rights that become more valuable through their activity 
monitoring companies to identify strategic opportunities and then 
presenting them to institutional investors for their approval—through a 
proxy fight, should the portfolio company resist the proposal. By giving 
the institutions this choice, the activists increase the value of governance 
rights; the institutions’ exercise of governance rights then becomes the 
mechanism for creating value for beneficial owners.114  
The point of tangency between these two specialists is that both 
activist and institutional shareholders must agree for a proposal to go 
forward. While activist investors frame and seek to force govern-
ance/performance changes, they are successful only if they can attract 
broad support from institutional investors capable of assessing alternative 
strategies presented to them, even if they will not formulate the strategies 
themselves. In effect, activists must make their case to sophisticated but 
not proactive governance rights holders.115 Such a reactive role is a more 
plausible model for institutional investor engagement, reflecting both 
their expertise and incentives.116 This interaction between intermediary 
                                                                                                                 
114. For a survey of evidence showing value creation for target shareholders by 
public hedge fund activism and evidence showing similar gains through private activism in 
Europe, see Marco Becht, Julian Franks & Jeremy Grant, Hedge Fund Activism in Europe 
5, 20–24 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 283, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616340 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
115 . See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text (providing evidence that 
institutional intermediaries are “rationally reticent”). 
116. Critics might object that this sort of specialization overly empowers the proxy 
advisory services, especially ISS, because of the extent to which institutions have de facto 
outsourced shareholder voting decisions, a strategy that economizes on governance costs. 
For a survey of literature on the role of ISS recommendations, see supra note 45. But even 
sharp critics of the general role of ISS regard the institutions as engaging in different 
decisionmaking in “votes with clear economic significance (such as mergers or election 
contests).” Latham & Watkins LLP, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and 
Institutional Voting 1 (2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf
/pub3446_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Such decisions are made by 
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institutions and shareholder activists, each with complementary special-
ized capacities, thus can mitigate the agency costs of agency capitalism 
through a mechanism that complements the reconcentration of record 
ownership.  
This happy complementarity requires an adequate supply of share-
holder activists, and thus the focus shifts to the return to activist share-
holders: It must be high enough when the activists are right—that is, 
when the intermediary institutions agree with the proffered strategy and 
the strategy in fact works—to warrant their effort, in light of the facts that 
the bulk of the gains from their effort will be captured by other share-
holders, and that their efforts will not always succeed.117 Gantchev’s 
recent work sheds light on the costs of hedge fund activism and its 
returns. A campaign that culminates in a proxy contest costs nearly $11 
million on average, he estimates.118 When costs are taken into account, 
                                                                                                                 
economically focused portfolio managers, not by centralized governance specialists who 
work from normative premises about value creation. See id. Recent evidence suggests that 
ISS’s influence may well be overstated. See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Proxy Advisors, supra 
note 45, at 906. 
117. A recent client letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a leading proponent 
of restricting activist shareholders, stated:  
[S]everal significant victories by boards of directors and corporations over 
activists could reduce hedge funds’ appetite for activism or alter their tactics or 
target selection criteria. AOL, Forest Laboratories and Cracker Barrel all 
successfully defended against months-long proxy fights . . . . Companies have 
succeeded in proxy fights by focusing on their business strategy, highlighting 
positive changes, whether financial or in corporate governance, and pointing 
out when the dissident had no long-term business strategy. 
Andrew R. Brownstein et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Mergers and Acquisitions—
2013, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Feb. 4, 2013, 9:48 AM) 
[hereinafter Wachtell 2013 Client Letter], http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2013/02/04/mergers-and-acquisitions-2013 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This is 
just the kind of constructive interplay that complementary specialization contemplates: 
The activists may propose, but the institutions dispose. 
118. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 623 tbl.7A. Gantchev models hedge fund activism 
as a sequential process and attaches costs to each stage, beginning with demand 
negotiations ($2.94 million on average), then requesting board representation ($1.83 
million on average), and finally, waging a proxy contest ($5.94 million on average). Thus, 
the average amount of costs for a campaign that goes through each stage is $10.71 million. 
Id. Of the 1,164 campaigns Gantchev tracked in the 2000 to 2007 period, only 7% resulted 
in a proxy contest. Id. at 618 tbl.1. But approximately 57% of these proxy contests resulted 
in activist success (meaning the attainment of the ultimate stated objective, which was not 
necessarily a board seat). Id. at 620 tbl.3B. In cases where the activist demanded board 
representation (the second stage, representing less than 20% of the sample), the success 
rate was approximately 39%. The initial intervention, styled a “demand” for negotiation, 
had the lowest success rate at approximately 7%. Id.  
Gantchev also replicates prior literature that reports evidence inconsistent with hedge 
fund “short termism,” the conventional criticism that “hedge fund activists [are] short-
term investors who make a quick profit at the expense of long-term shareholders.” 
Excluding campaigns in which the activist made no formal demand, the average duration 
of an activist campaign is nineteen months. Id. at 621. The variation around that average 
skews to the right, however; the seventy-fifth percentile for a campaign with specific 
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nominal hedge fund returns are on average cut by approximately two-
thirds. 119  These benefit-cost considerations become important when 
considering the regulatory framework within which activism operates.  
In this analysis, the specialization of institutional investors in 
portfolio management—including assessing proposals presented by activ-
ist shareholders—and the specialization of activist shareholders in 
actively monitoring management performance and strategy and propos-
ing alternatives are complementary, a result of the evolution of condi-
tions in the capital markets. The rise of intermediary institutional inves-
tors and the corresponding reconcentration of ownership result in both 
the undervaluation of governance rights and the corresponding oppor-
tunity for activist shareholders to arbitrage that valuation differential. Yet 
this is not a classic arbitrage opportunity because the payoff depends 
upon both the credibility of the activist and the persuasiveness of its 
proposal to the controlling institutional shareholders.120  
The average activist block is roughly 8%, far less than a control 
block.121 When the activist nonetheless succeeds, what is the source of the 
success? It is unlikely that the activist shareholder bedazzles management 
with the astuteness of its strategic and operating proposals. In cases 
where management adopts some or all of the activist’s proposals without 
a proxy contest, management presumably believes that the activist can 
persuasively address the institutional investors who own a majority of the 
firm. In cases where the activist pursues a proxy contest, the vote is a 
plebiscite that requires shareholder approval of the activist’s proposals. 
                                                                                                                 
demands is twenty-six months, and the twenty-fifth percentile is six months. Id. at 621 
tbl.4A. The average initial ownership stake at the beginning of a campaign is 8%, which 
increases only to 9% over the course of the campaign; apparently the size of the activist’s 
ownership stake does not affect the probability of success (where success is defined in 
terms of initial demand outcomes). Id. at 621, 622 tbl.5A.  
119. Id. at 625 tbl.8C, 626. Much like the case with venture capitalism, skill in 
identifying situations where activism can both produce returns and succeed is not 
randomly distributed. The top quartile of activists earns most of the returns. Id. at 625 
tbl.8. It is also likely that more successful activists will take on large firms. Success brings 
more resources, which means capacity to acquire “activism” blocks in bigger firms. 
Activism costs do not increase much with firm size. See supra note 107 and accompanying 
text (noting decision costs of portfolio management are fixed). Thus, assuming available 
resources to make the block acquisition, larger firms should be targeted by the more 
successful activists.  
120. This is consistent with empirical literature showing that activists are likely to 
target firms with significant institutional ownership, and in evaluating otherwise equivalent 
firms are more likely to target the firms with higher institutional ownership. See Alon Brav 
et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 
1729, 1750 tbl.III (2008) [hereinafter Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance] (noting 
target firms on average have about 45% institutional ownership); Gantchev, supra note 
112, at 622 tbl.6, 623 (“[T]argets have significantly higher institutional ownership, which is 
a critical determinant of campaign success in the more confrontational stages of 
activism.”).  
121. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 622 tbl.5A; see also Brav et al., Activism and Firm 
Performance, supra note 120, at 1747 tbl.IIA (noting median initial ownership is 6.30%). 
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In short, governance markets become more complete through interac-
tions in which activists propose and institutional investors dispose.  
Recent empirical work is consistent with this account. Gantchev 
models the sequential process of governance activism and describes the 
frequency of each stage.122 First, the activist shareholder assembles a toe-
hold position, acquiring shares at a price as yet unaffected by the 
activist’s plans. Public knowledge of the activist’s efforts comes with the 
filing of a statement on Schedule 13D that discloses the activist’s greater-
than-5% ownership stake and its intentions and objectives.123 Next comes 
the “demand negotiation” stage, in which the activist seeks to persuade 
target management to voluntarily adopt the activist’s proposal. If this 
fails, then a “board representation” stage begins, in which the activist 
threatens a proxy contest and recruits director nominees. Should 
management still refuse to adopt the proposal, the final step is an actual 
contest.124 Of particular interest is the declining frequency of each stage 
and the increasing success rate at the later stages.125 For example, of the 
initial 13D filings by hedge fund activists, only approximately 30% go to 
the negotiation stage.126 This pattern is consistent with the interaction we 
posit. After public posting of a bond (the toehold investment) to 
establish its credibility and secure the chance of its return, the activist 
undertakes a nonpublic campaign to elicit a favorable institutional 
response.127 Subsequent actions reveal the outcome of such efforts. With 
approbation, the activist proceeds; without, it withdraws, realizing that 
the chances for success are low. The relatively low fraction of initial 
interventions that proceed to the next stage suggests a high burden of 
persuasion for institutional support.  
Gantchev also shows that the success rate (as measured in terms of 
initial demands) increases as the activist persists.128 Presumably this is 
because the activist evaluates the likelihood of success at each stage in 
                                                                                                                 
122. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 612–14. 
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2012) (requiring any person acquiring beneficial 
ownership of any equity security of more than 5% to file with SEC statement on Schedule 
13D within ten days after acquisition); Gantchev, supra note 112, at 613 (explaining 
announcement of activist intentions as initial step).  
The activist shareholder’s predisclosure acquisition of a significant toehold is critical 
to its business model. The timing of required disclosure thus directly affects the activist’s 
expected returns. Part V below considers current proposals to accelerate the disclosure 
requirement and thereby limit the activist’s return by reducing the amount of 
predisclosure stock that can be acquired. 
124. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 613–14. 
125. Id. at 620 tbl.3B.  
126. Id. 
127. See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3093, 3108–11 (2009) 
(suggesting shareholder activism is predominantly executed through private interventions 
both with target management and with other institutions). Just as sometimes the best 
auctions are silent, so too are activism campaigns.  
128. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 620 tbl.3B.  
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deciding whether to continue, and the target makes the same assessment 
at each stage as it seeks out information about institutional sympathy for 
the activist’s proposals.  
There is a growing empirical literature that documents the impact of 
activist shareholder efforts on target company stock prices. Gantchev 
reports average (median) “raw” shareholder returns of approximately 
39% (33%) over the average nineteen-month campaign period and 
average (median) annualized market-adjusted returns of approximately 
4% (4%).129 Brav et al. report average (median) raw target shareholder 
returns of 42% (18%) over the campaign period and annualized average 
(median) market adjusted returns of 21% (4%).130 Klein and Zur report 
average target shareholder market-adjusted returns of approximately 
22% over a one-year post-initiation period.131 
Part III has shown that the agency costs of agency capitalism arise in 
significant part from the specialization of intermediary institutions in 
providing beneficial owners low-cost diversification at the cost of a 
business model that does not value governance rights. This Part then 
shows that specialization by activist investors in arbitraging the value of 
governance rights—the difference between the value of institutions’ 
governance rights before and after the intervention of an activist 
investor—may be part of the cure. Institutional investors specialize in 
portfolio selection and performance; activist shareholders specialize in 
framing alternatives to existing company strategies and thereby increas-
ing the value of governance rights to institutional investors. In effect, 
capital market evolution has broken up the ownership bundle between 
rationally reticent institutional investors and potentially activist share-
holders. To support effective governance, the legal regime needs to 
foster conditions in which the bundle can be reassembled through the 
complementary capacities and engagement of both.132 Part V turns to 
                                                                                                                 
129. Id. at 625 tbl.8, tbl.4A.  
130. Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance, supra note 120, at 1760, 1761 
tbl.VI.A. 
131. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge 
Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 188, 226 (2009). Although hedge fund 
targets experience higher returns upon 13D filing than other activists’ targets, the reverse 
is true for subsequent gains; at the end of the year, the totals are approximately the same. 
Id. 
132. As an alternative mechanism, others have suggested pass-through voting by the 
holders of beneficial interests in investment intermediaries. See, e.g., Richard M. 
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 
Brook. L. Rev. 1, 47–52 (1991) (discussing pass-through voting by pension fund 
beneficiaries); Taub, supra note 45, at 888–89 (extending suggestion to mutual fund 
shareholders). Such suggestions seem highly likely to fail because of the original Berle-
Means problem: the passivity of dispersed owners.  
Gantchev and Jokikasthira propose an alternative hedge fund/institutional investor 
interaction, in which institutional exit reduces an issuer’s stock price and may also signal 
an underperformance problem. This in turn may trigger an activist intervention. See 
Nickolay Gantchev & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Hedge Fund Activists: Do They Take Cues 
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present regulatory initiatives that would skew the balance against the 
control of the agency costs this Article has identified.  
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGULATORY REGIME 
The sustainability of the collaboration between institutional 
investors and activist shareholders depends on the regulatory regime that 
governs the activists’ accumulation of shares. The activist incurs costs: the 
research necessary to identify an opportunity to improve a target’s 
business strategy; the financing and opportunity costs of its equity 
position; the idiosyncratic risk resulting from holding an undiversified 
position; and the costs of the activist campaign, from engagement with 
the target to the costs associated with a proxy contest, including legal 
counsel, proxy advisors, solicitation costs, and the like.133 The activist 
needs to anticipate recovering these costs and earning a favorable risk-
adjusted return before it will enter the business in the first place and 
engage with identified companies.  
The cost recovery and the profits come from the returns on the 
activist’s toehold equity position secured before public disclosure of that 
position and the activist’s plan. Consider alternative sources of cost 
recovery. A contract with institutional owners to cover expenses or share 
gains would both incur significant coordination costs and entangle the 
institutions in the regulatory regime that covers share accumulations, an 
unattractive scenario.134 The target is also an improbable source of cost 
                                                                                                                 
from Institutional Exit? 23 (Feb. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139482 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “strong 
positive relationship” between institutional selling volume and chance of being targeted by 
activists). From our perspective, even if the institutional investor’s exit can be seen as a 
governance device, it requires a complementary action by an activist in order to be most 
effective.  
Thus we may see the emergence of a new ecology for the monitoring of managerial 
underperformance. The signal associated with institutional selling reduces the activist’s 
investigation costs; the subsequent activist intervention increases the value of the 
institutions’ voting rights. Even if the selling institution will not benefit from the particular 
intervention (because it has exited from its position), its beneficiaries will benefit from an 
environment of superior monitoring. The potential triggering of activist intervention adds 
to the governance value of the institutional decision to exit. Integrating the role of the 
activist investor amplifies the expression of institutional “voice” as recently developed in 
the finance literature. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” 
and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2645 (2009) 
(observing blockholder selling exerts influence through effect on management’s stock-
related compensation). A compensation effect is a relatively “weak form” of governance 
check; by contrast, drawing in a shareholder activist is a “strong form” of governance 
check. The institutional/activist interaction magnifies the governance impact of 
institutional selling and lowers the activist’s cost of target identification. 
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing average costs of activist 
campaign). 
134. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation 13D-G 
promulgated thereunder make it clear that any such agreement would render all parties 
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recovery. Precisely because the activist’s campaign typically is not to elect 
a board majority, the activist cannot anticipate that a post-proxy fight-
friendly board would elect to reimburse its expenses.135 An activist’s pur-
suit of adoption of a shareholder bylaw calling for reimbursement of 
proxy contest expenses, newly permitted under Delaware law,136 is both 
highly speculative and dilutes the activist’s single minded campaign to 
increase the target’s stock price and thus the activist’s credibility. The 
activist’s return depends on stock price appreciation, gains that are 
shared pro rata with other shareholders.137  
In a “success” case, the activist’s return is a function of the size of its 
block and the increase in the target’s stock price as a result of the target’s 
adoption of the proposal, whether voluntarily or following a proxy 
contest. A great deal of empirical evidence shows that the target’s stock 
price immediately appreciates upon disclosure of the activist’s block, 
depending importantly on the expectation that the activist has a substan-
tive policy proposal. 138  This appreciation increases with the activist’s 
                                                                                                                 
members of a “group” that is deemed to have beneficial ownerships of the shares of all 
such parties. If the group owns more than 5% of an issuer’s outstanding stock, group 
members have a filing obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b) 
(2012). This will impose costs and liability risks on all parties who have entered into the 
agreement.  
135. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairfield Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 
(N.Y. 1955) (holding board may, though is not required to, reimburse successful proxy 
contestants in proxy fights over corporate policy).  
136. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 113 (2012).  
137. Cf. supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining institutional investor 
would have to share benefits from intervention with competitors but would bear all costs). 
138. See, e.g., Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance, supra note 120, at 1760 
(“The large average abnormal stock return around the Schedule 13D filing date is 
consistent with the view that the market anticipates that hedge funds’ activism will result in 
actual value improvement.”); Klein & Zur, supra note 131, at 188 (summarizing studies 
that suggest “the market believes activism creates shareholder value”). For earlier studies 
on potential control entrepreneurs, see Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, 
Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 555, 562–
63 (1985) (finding first public announcement by “corporate raiders” of their 
stockholdings led to positive abnormal returns); Wayne H. Mikkelson & Richard S. 
Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Process, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 523, 533 
(1985) (“The announcements of [13D] filings appear to increase the stock price of both 
acquiring and target firms.”). For a useful survey, see generally Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & 
Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 Found. & Trends Fin. 185 (2009) 
[hereinafter Brav et al., Review].  
There is debate over the source of gains associated with hedge fund activism. 
Greenwood and Schor suggest that the gains come almost exclusively from subsequent 
takeovers. Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. 
Econ. 362, 368–70 (2009). This seems at odds with the extended average holding period 
documented by Brav et al. See Brav et al., Review, supra, at 205 (finding average holding 
period of hedge fund activist’s position is “close to two years”); supra note 118 (discussing 
Gantchev’s study which reports average duration of activist campaign is nineteen months). 
More recently, Brav, Jiang, and Kim used plant-level data drawn from the U.S. census to 
show that improvements in production efficiency at target firms and efficiently redeployed 
capital are significant channels for the realization of activist-associated gains. See Alon 
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reputation for successful engagement;139 the immediate market reaction 
anticipates a very large fraction of the gains associated with a successful 
activism campaign. These dynamics make the regulatory choices over the 
timing of disclosure critical: The activist’s business model depends on 
being able to secure a large enough equity position before required 
disclosure of that position drives up the price of the target’s stock. Thus, 
the centrality of the disclosure regime sets the context for understanding 
regulatory initiatives in the United States and the European Union to 
accelerate the disclosure of the activists’ initial positions. These initiatives 
contain three elements: reducing the ownership threshold that triggers 
disclosure, shortening the period for disclosure following the ownership 
trigger being hit, and limiting the use of equity derivatives by including 
them in calculating the ownership amount.140  
Each of these elements will have the effect of reducing the returns to 
activist shareholders. This is because they will reduce the economic stake 
that an activist shareholder can accumulate before mandatory disclosure 
of its holding drives up the price of the target company’s stock. As noted 
previously, toehold acquisitions are the major source of the activist’s re-
turn;141 these regulatory initiatives would reduce the returns to activism. 
It is not just that smaller blocks would undermine the activist’s credibility 
and thus effectiveness. Rather, and more importantly, reducing the size 
of the toeholds that activists can accumulate before disclosure reduces 
their returns. The likely outcome would be that the activist sector would 
shrink, fewer firms would be identified as targets for strategic initiatives, 
and the activists would reduce costly campaign efforts. The result would 
be greater undervaluation of voting rights because of the reduced attrac-
tion of arbitraging the difference in the value of governance rights to 
reticent institutional investors and to an activist shareholder.142 
                                                                                                                 
Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, 
Risk, and Product Market Competition 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17517, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17517.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review).  
139. See Emanuel Zur, The Power of Reputation: Hedge Fund Activists 29–30 (Dec. 
15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267397 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding higher announcement premium associated 
with hedge funds’ reputation for being successful in gaining board seats). 
140. See infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory initiatives 
by U.K. and E.U. authorities); infra notes 146–147 and accompanying text (discussing 
proposals in United States). 
141. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text (explaining toehold position is 
essential to cost recovery by activists because alternative sources of gain are not 
satisfactory). 
142. This can be understood as a particularized application of Grossman and 
Stiglitz’s demonstration that capital markets cannot be perfectly “informationally 
efficient”; arbitrageurs would no longer engage in the activity that impounds information 
into price if inefficiency did not allow an arbitrage profit. See Sanford J. Grossman & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 393, 405 (1980) (“[B]ecause information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the 
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The United Kingdom and the European Union have moved far 
down this road. The United Kingdown has adopted an ownership 
disclosure threshold of 3% and a two-day disclosure requirement.143 
Comparable initiatives are also underway in other E.U. member states 
and Canada.144 From our perspective, there is considerable irony in this 
                                                                                                                 
information which is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would 
receive no compensation.”). Reducing the returns to activist investors would similarly 
reduce their efforts to move the value of the company toward its fundamental efficiency. 
143. For disclosure rules in the United Kingdom, see Fin. Servs. Auth., Disclosure 
Rules and Transparency Rules §§ 5.1.2, 5.8.3 (2013), available at http://media.fshandboo
k.info/content/full/DTR.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (requiring 
shareholder to notify U.K. issuer of percentage of shareholder’s voting rights when it 
“reaches . . . 3% . . . and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100%” in no later than two 
trading days). 
144. For Germany’s maximum four-day lag, see Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel 
[WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBl. I at 2708, § 21(1), last amended by 
Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBl. I at 1126, art. 3, translated in Securities Trading Act, 
BaFin: Fed. Fin. Supervisory Authority, http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht
/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2013) (“Any party . . . whose shareholding in [a German] issuer . . . reaches, 
exceeds or falls below 3 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent, 
30 percent, 50 percent or 75 percent of the voting rights . . . shall . . . within four trading 
days . . . notify . . . the issuer and . . . the Supervisory Authority . . . .”). For France’s four-
day provision, see Code de Commerce [C. Com.] art. L. 233-7, translated in The French 
Commercial Code in English 262–63 (Philip Raworth trans., 2009) (requiring any person 
who comes into possession of shares representing more than 5% of issuer’s voting rights to 
inform issuer within time limit set by Council of State); General Regulation of the Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers art. 223-14 (last amended Sept. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7552_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (specifying Article L. 233-7 notification shall be filed no later than close of 
trading on fourth trading day after shareholding threshold has been crossed). For Italy’s 
five-day maximum, see Regulation Implementing Italian Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 
February 1998, Concerning the Discipline of Issuers art. 121, available at 
http://www.consob.it/documenti/english/laws/reg11971e_2009_art.116-ter_121.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Declarations of holding . . . shall be made without 
delay and in any event within five trading days of the date of the transaction leading to the 
obligation . . . .”).  
For a discussion and critical analysis of actions and proposals throughout Europe to 
require disclosure of equity derivative positions, following the U.K. model, including a 
recent consultation by the Committee on European Securities Regulation (CESR), now 
the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA), see Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-Georg 
Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives—An Intentions-Based 
Approach 16 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 36, 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
Canada has proposed revisions to its ownership disclosure regime that would drop 
the triggering percentage from its current 10% level to 5%. Canadian Sec. Adm’rs, 
Proposed Amendments to MI 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, NP 62-203 Take-
Over Bids and Issuer Bids, and NI 62-103 Early Warning System and Related Take-Over 
Bid and Insider Reporting Issues (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/d
ocuments/en/Securities-Category6/mi_20130313_62-104_take-over-bids.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). The Canadian proposal would leave in place the obligation to 
file the disclosure report two days after reaching the trigger and to report subsequent 
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position. On the one hand, the United Kingdom in its Stewardship Code 
and the European Union in comparable measures both seek greater 
institutional investor engagement with portfolio companies.145 In our 
view, this effort is likely to fail, since it conflicts with the institutions’ 
business model. On the other hand, the analysis in Part IV highlights 
shareholder activism as addressing the agency costs of institutional 
ownership—the undervaluation of governance rights that, if exercised, 
would benefit the beneficial owners—by creating a new channel for 
otherwise reticent institutional voice. In effect, shareholder activism is 
what the stewardship movement desires but cannot achieve on its terms. 
Because institutional investors ultimately decide whether an activist’s 
campaign will succeed, activism potentiates institutional voice by putting 
choices to the institutions. Reducing the size of a predisclosure stake that 
an activist shareholder can acquire has precisely the wrong effect: 
Reducing the returns to activist shareholders would reduce the number 
of strategic initiatives by activist shareholders and ultimately result in 
reticent intermediary institutions continuing to undervalue governance 
rights. So in sidelining activist investors, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union are also sidelining the institutions—just those whose 
roles are simultaneously sought to be expanded into stewardship. 
A. Proposal of Reducing the Ownership Threshold and Shortening the Disclosure 
Window 
The SEC has received recent importuning to follow the United 
Kingdom and various other countries in shortening the disclosure 
window and broadening the definition of beneficial share ownership to 
cover purely economic positions generated by derivative trades.146 The 
SEC has signaled that its current position—a ten-day disclosure period 
and a more restrictive definition of beneficial ownership—may be 
reconsidered.147 Because the authors write as American legal academics, 
                                                                                                                 
increases of more than 2%. The proposal would extend the updating obligation to 
decreases of more than 2%. Id. 
The proposed amendments to the Canadian disclosure regime would also expand the 
instruments included in calculating a shareholder’s ownership for purposes of the 
disclosure trigger to encompass derivatives, such as total return swaps. It would also 
require lenders of securities to report loans of more than 2% of an issuer’s outstanding 
shares. Id. 
145 . See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing U.K. and E.U. 
proposals).  
146. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 1–2 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Wachtell Petition], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (requesting SEC to “shorten the reporting deadline and expand the 
definition of beneficial ownership under the reporting rules” under 1934 Act). 
147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §929R(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1866 (2010) (amending section 13 of Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and specifically authorizing SEC to reduce trigger period for 
disclosure); Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
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this Article will address the proposals made to the SEC with more speci-
ficity; however, some of the policy proposals here have carryover value 
for other jurisdictions. 
Part of what animates the proponents of faster disclosure after the 
activist crosses the disclosure-triggering threshold is the concern that 
activists can accumulate ownership positions far in excess of the 5% 
threshold during the current ten-day period before disclosure is 
required.148 There are anecdotes to this effect, although evidence shows 
that activists on average take blocks under 10%.149  
There are two objections to activists more aggressively exploiting the 
ten-day window. First, public shareholders who unknowingly sell to the 
activist are disadvantaged, because they are selling at a price that ex-
cludes the potential benefits of the activist’s initiative.150 Second, the 
activist may be able to accumulate a control position or at least a position 
of strong influence without paying a control premium, or for reasons 
that threaten majoritarian shareholder interests.151 As discussed below, 
these are weak arguments or point to problems otherwise readily 
addressed in the U.S. setting.  
The first objection fails on the stating of it. A shareholder’s decision 
to sell results either from liquidity needs or the shareholder’s reservation 
price for the security in question. Any asymmetry of information involved 
in the transaction arises from the activist’s private information about its 
own intentions, which may include a forecast as to the likely target firm 
response. Why does the selling shareholder have an entitlement to share 
in the value of information created by the analysis of other investors? The 
thin logic of an argument whose goal is to facilitate a free riding strategy 
becomes even clearer when the question is examined from the ex ante 
shareholder perspective, a familiar analytic approach. Assume that share-
                                                                                                                 
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2011/spch121511mls.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting SEC 
planned to review and modernize beneficial ownership reporting rules, including whether 
to shorten ten-day window and whether to include use of cash-settled equity swaps).  
148. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 2–3 (arguing statutory purposes of 
13(d) reporting requirement are disserved by investors exploiting ten-day reporting 
window to accumulate shares at lower price). 
149. Gantchev’s analysis of 1164 campaigns over the 2000 to 2007 period shows that 
the activists’ mean (median) stock ownership position at the outset of the campaign was 
8.5% (7.0%). Gantchev, supra note 112, at 622 tbl.5A. In the seventy-fifth percentile, 
initial ownership was still only 10%. In the ninety-fifth percentile, initial ownership was 
16%. Id. Interestingly, the initial ownership for successful campaigns was on average 
6.81%, less than the 7.16% for unsuccessful campaigns. Id. at 622 tbl.5B.  
150. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 6 (arguing disclosure lag “result[s] in a 
substantial transfer of value to [activists] . . . from the public shareholders who sold their 
shares during the ten-day window without knowledge of the [activists’] plans”). 
151. See id. at 3 (arguing ten-day reporting lag “serves the interest of no one but the 
investor seeking to exploit this period of permissible silence to acquire shares at a discount 
to the market price that may result from its belated disclosures”). 
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holders are diversified (or have the opportunity to diversify) and that 
whether one is a selling shareholder or a holding shareholder is un-
biased. Immediate disclosure will restrict the activist’s opportunity to 
build a toehold stake, thereby reducing the returns to activism, and thus 
the occasions for activism and the net gains to other shareholders from 
the activist’s revaluation of institutional shareholders’ governance rights 
across a portfolio of firms. Shareholders ex ante would presumably 
prefer a rule that increased their average wealth, even if in a particular 
case they lost an opportunity to free ride on the activist’s efforts. The 
shareholders can’t have it both ways: A regulatory structure that gives 
shareholders the opportunity to free ride on knowledge of activists’ 
strategies reduces the shareholders’ opportunity to gain from the activ-
ists’ strategic monitoring and presentation of strategic alternatives to 
reticent institutions. 
Shareholders would have the same view of the current SEC rule that 
allows institutional investors who do not seek to influence control to 
delay public disclosure of their accumulation of positions in a company 
until they have completed the acquisition.152 For example, the SEC 
allowed Berkshire Hathaway to delay reporting its acquisition of a signifi-
cant stake in IBM stock because disclosure of the stake would have made 
it more costly for Berkshire Hathaway to acquire it in the first place.153 
Since shareholders as a group benefit from Berkshire Hathaway’s 
accumulation, premature disclosure would hurt rather than help.154  
                                                                                                                 
152. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(3) (2006) 
(allowing SEC to exempt institutional investment manager or security from reporting 
rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1) (2012) (requiring certain “institutional investment 
managers” who exercise “investment discretion” to file report on Form 13F with SEC 
“within 45 days after the last day of each . . . calendar quarter[]”); Form 13F, Report of 
Institutional Investment Manager Pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, id. § 249.325.  
153. See Serena Ng, Erik Holm & Spencer E. Ante, Buffet Bets $10.7 Billion in the 
Biggest Tech Foray, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/S
B10001424052970204323904577037742077676990.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“Berkshire secretly had been accumulating the shares . . . receiving confidential 
treatment from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which otherwise mandates that 
big investors disclose their holdings . . . .”). 
154. Thus we have concerns about the recent rulemaking petition of the NYSE 
Euronext and management-side governance groups seeking a shortened reporting 
deadline for postquarter disclosure of institutional investor ownership positions, see supra 
note 152, from forty-five days to two days. NYSE Euronext, Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & 
Governance Prof’ls & Nat’l Investor Relations Inst., Petition for Rulemaking Under 
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 9–10 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-659.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). Although transparency as to institutional ownership positions is generally 
desirable, it needs to be balanced against potential harms to those who own shares 
through an institutional intermediary. As noted in the text, if the institution is in the midst 
of position-building or unwinding, the fortuity of a quarter ending point ought not to 
impose extra costs. Such a concern applies to “reticent” institutions as well as “active” 
institutions who have not entered the special disclosure regime of section 13(d). Among 
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To be sure, the first objection may have in part motivated Congress 
to adopt section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act in 1967.155 We 
know now more about how capital markets work than was known in 1967, 
however, and in all events, the issue is not the repeal of any disclosure 
regime governing share accumulations, but whether the SEC should ex-
tend the reach of the current regime—a decision within the SEC’s discre-
tion, rather than simply a blind application of congressional intent in 
1967.156 In this context, congressional intent does not have a forty-five-
year-long shadow.157 
The second objection—that the activist may be seeking to acquire 
control, near-control, or at least overwhelming influence in the ten-day 
window—should be taken more seriously but with a caveat. In the 
decades of various forms of shareholder activism since the adoption of 
the current disclosure regime, the instances of significant block building 
in the ten-day window are relatively few.158 This is in part because rapid 
significant accumulation becomes known to market intermediaries and is 
impounded in the price,159 thus undercutting the economic rationale for 
                                                                                                                 
other considerations, forcing immediate postquarter disclosure will distort trading 
patterns as the quarter-end approaches. To avoid harm, a shortened disclosure deadline 
would need to be coupled with a reaffirmed waiver policy. 
155. This claim of legislative intent is vigorously presented by Emmerich et al., supra 
note 13 (manuscript at 4–9) (reviewing legislative history of Williams Act and noting 
explicit congressional mandate for transparency and full and fair disclosure of large 
accumulations of public company stock). 
156. This, of course, assumes that “congressional intent” as manifested in anything 
other than the statutory text is a meaningful interpretive guide, a premise that the current 
fashion for “textualism” might contest. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 640–56 (1990) (outlining tenets of “new textualism” 
and discussing criticisms of traditional approach relying on legislative history); John F. 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420, 424 (2005) (noting 
modern textualists “deny that Congress has a collective will apart from [statutory text]” but 
believe “the only meaningful collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the 
public meaning of the final statutory text”).  
157. In a similar vein is Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs’ recent invitation 
to rethink elements of the state’s case law in light of changing patterns of share ownership 
and other capital market conditions. Jack B. Jacobs, Does the New Corporate Shareholder 
Profile Call for a New Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 19, 26–31 
(2012). 
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (noting small ownership at outset of 
activist campaigns). 
159. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 569–72 (1984) (“[E]ven a single knowledgeable trader with 
sufficient resources[] can . . . cause prices to reflect information by persistent trading at a 
premium over ‘uninformed’ price levels.”). Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that 
rapid accumulations without significant price impact will be difficult for all but the 
highest-liquidity stocks. See Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Do Prices Reveal the 
Presence of Informed Trading? 35 fig.3 (Aug. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023629 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(showing activists gradually accumulate their pre-13D blocks on high-volume trading 
days). This evidence is consistent with market participants’ views that significant, sudden 
910 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:863 
  
accumulation, and also because the activist’s idiosyncratic risks are 
increasing in investment size. Remember that a genuine governance 
entrepreneur, not a control seeker, requires approval of its proffered 
strategy by sophisticated investors after having heard the target 
company’s vigorous argument on the other side. Failing that, the 
campaign itself will fail, leaving the activist with large potential losses.160  
And emphasizing the importance of changes in the capital markets 
and corporate governance over the last forty-five years, private ordering 
(with the not insubstantial assistance of the Delaware Supreme Court) 
already provides a response to the concern about secret control changes 
that deprive shareholders of a premium. The poison pill affords a 
remedy that can effectively prohibit undisclosed accumulations.161 The 
authors hardly endorse the “just say no” version of the pill, which is 
seemingly blessed by the Delaware courts, 162  but a time-limited pill 
                                                                                                                 
share acquisitions would materially move market prices. See, e.g., Christopher R. 
Concannon, Virtu Financial LLC, Remarks at Columbia Program on the Law and 
Economics of Capital Markets: High Frequency Trading (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/capital-markets/cap_mktsWorkshops2 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting significant price impact from large, even 
medium, orders in present market and particular shortfall in liquidity for stock beyond 
top 1000). 
160. See Wachtell 2013 Client Letter, supra note 117 (noting in 2013 companies like 
AOL, Forest Laboratories, and Cracker Barrel successfully defended against months-long 
proxy fights because institutional investors were not persuaded by activists). 
161. The standard “flip-in” “shareholder rights plan” establishes an ownership 
threshold (commonly between 10% and 20%), the crossing of which will trigger massive 
dilution of the acquiror’s position. For periodic updates on pill practices, see 
SharkRepellent.net, http://www.sharkrepellent.net (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2013). A critical feature in most pills is that the definition of 
beneficial ownership either tracks the “acting in concert” provisions of the SEC’s 13D-G 
regulations or broadens them. See Steven M. Davidoff, Netflix’s Poison Pill Has a 
Shareholder-Friendly Flavor, N.Y. Times DealBook (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:14 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/netflixs-poison-pill-has-a-shareholder-friendly-
flavor (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]ompanies have adopted group language 
like ‘acting with conscious parallelism,’ ‘acting in concert’ or ‘cooperating’ in order to 
prevent activist hedge funds from working together.”); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3(b) (2012) 
(including within definition of “beneficial owner” any person who “creates or uses a trust, 
proxy, power of attorney, pooling arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or 
device . . . to evade . . . section 13(d) or (g) of the Act”). The effect of such pill provisions 
is to make it difficult for significant shareholders to collaborate on an activist initiative. 
See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. 11,510, 1990 WL 114222, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 
1990) (upholding pill provisions that would include committee participation, forming 
joint slate, or expense sharing within definition of acting in concert). SharkRepellent.net 
reports that the largest fraction of recent pill adoptions, which were not routine but 
responsive to specific threats, have been in connection with activism and control issues. 
John Laide, 2012 Poison Pill Impetus, SharkRepellent.net (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www. 
sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=undefined&pg=/pub/rs_20121127.html&2
012_Poison_Pill_Impetus&rnd=369637 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
162. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (holding 
target board’s adoption of poison pill was not preclusive but “a proportionate defensive 
response to protect its stockholders from a ‘low ball’ bid”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. 
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authorized by shareholders rather than unilaterally adopted by 
management, a form of “chewable pill,” would address this potential 
problem.163 A threshold of 15% or 20% would accommodate activism 
without opening the way to the accumulation of a control block.164  
One way to read the current campaign to compel quicker disclosure 
of shareholder accumulations is as an effort to persuade the SEC to 
impose the equivalent of a poison pill with a very low trigger at a time 
when institutional investors are successfully pressuring boards to turn 
away from poison pills. There is a history here. The genius of the poison 
pill was that shareholder approval was not necessary; all that was neces-
sary was board approval.165 In the not-so-distant past, almost all firms 
could be assumed to have pills, either already adopted or subject to 
adoption at a moment’s notice; in effect, a virtual pill. But, in no small 
measure because institutional investors came to oppose pills, when 
proposals to redeem them come to the shareholders, more boards have 
let pills lapse, or have not adopted them, even when a control battle may 
be brewing.166  
                                                                                                                 
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 127–29 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Chandler, C.) (holding Delaware law 
permitted retention of pill even after incumbent board lost election proxy contest and 
shareholders had more than one year to consider bidding offer); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal 
Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 491, 493–501 
(2001) (reviewing Delaware case law). 
163. In this form, the pill would be a contractual version of the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s preferred position with respect to the pill announced initially in City Capital 
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798–800 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(holding target board’s decision not to redeem poison pill was unreasonable because it 
would “in effect permanently foreclose their shareholders from accepting a noncoercive 
offer for their stock,” a threat “far too mild to justify such a step”), overruled by 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) (rejecting Interco 
approach because “it would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a 
‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board of directors”). The Delaware Chancery 
Court recently reaffirmed its preference in Interco in Airgas, while acknowledging the 
contrary controlling Delaware Supreme Court view. 16 A.3d at 101. 
164. Other barriers to rapid accumulation of equity positions are also significant. For 
example, for large capitalization firms, the requirement to file under section 7A of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006), which is keyed to the value of the stock acquired 
rather than the percentage of outstanding equity acquired, will often limit the toehold to a 
level far short of that allowed under § 13(d). This, in turn, makes the issue of extending 
the computation of beneficial ownership under § 13(d) to derivatives more important. See 
infra Part V.B. The current thresholds are set forth at Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds of 
the Clayton Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
165. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: 
Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 Bus. Law. 1419, 1431 (2005) (“It is not far fetched to claim 
that, were a shareholder vote to be required, very few firms now could secure approval of a 
broadly framed poison pill.”). 
166. Andrew L. Bab & Sean P. Neenan, The Conference Bd., Inc., Poison Pills in 
2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename
=TCB%20DN-V3N5-11.pdf&type=subsite (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Over the 
past decade, fewer and fewer public companies have maintained traditionally structured 
poison pills.”).  
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Moreover, although the rare circumstance may validate a low 
threshold (5%) pill, 167  higher triggers are much more prevalent, 168 
reflecting both expectations about unstated judicial limits and board 
reluctance to take an extreme position in the face of institutional 
investor opposition. Shortening the disclosure period would go far 
toward capping the activist’s ownership stake, not because of a legal 
prohibition against acquiring more, but because the economics would 
militate against it. And it is at this point that the promanagement beauty 
of the proposed SEC action to accelerate disclosure under the Williams 
Act emerges from the cloud of advocacy. From the perspective of those 
urging lower and quicker disclosure triggers at a time when neither the 
shareholders nor the board will adopt a pill trigger that is directed at 
activist shareholders, the proposed SEC rule change will impose it on all 
corporations without the approval of either shareholders or boards. Put 
differently, the SEC would be adopting a regulatory pill directed at 
activist shareholders at precisely the moment that boards, increasingly, 
would not adopt one—a genuine coup for those who prefer not only 
more protection for management from its shareholders, but now more 
protection from its board as well.169  
B. Proposal of Including Economic Exposure Through Derivatives 
The second policy question posed by the proposal to the SEC relates 
to whether, independent of the timing of disclosure, economic exposure 
generated through derivatives should count within the definition of 
beneficial ownership for determining the disclosure threshold.170 Here 
the issue is not the accumulation of shares with voting rights, but the 
acquisition of a purely economic interest. The technique provides eco-
nomic returns to the activist shareholder on its activity without watering 
                                                                                                                 
167. See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601–06 (Del. 2010) (finding 
target’s “adoption of a 4.99% trigger for its Rights Plan would not preclude a hostile 
bidder’s ability to marshal enough shareholder votes to win a proxy contest” and was 
reasonable response to threat of change in control and loss of company’s net operating 
loss carryforwards); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on 
the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 Ind. L.J. 1087, 1098–1111 
(2012) (discussing Selectica and its implications).  
168. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 13, at 56 (showing in recent survey 85% of 
805 public companies that have pills in place have ownership threshold of higher than 
10%, while 24% have pills triggered by higher than 15%).  
169. Emmerich et al. cleverly but unpersuasively argue that boards’ reluctance to 
adopt pills is a reason for the SEC to act. See Emmerich et al., supra note 13 (manuscript 
at 15–16). 
170. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 7–9 (proposing SEC expand definition 
of “beneficial ownership” under Regulation 13D-G to include ownership through 
derivatives); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §766(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1799 (2010) (providing sale or purchase of 
security-based swaps constitutes beneficial ownership only to extent that SEC deems it so 
by rule); cf. supra note 144 (discussing proposals to require disclosure of derivative 
position in E.U. member states and Canada).  
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down the critical test that the activist must survive to earn that return—
the approval of the institutional shareholders.  
The easiest way for the activist shareholder to achieve an economic 
interest divorced from voting rights that could influence the corpora-
tion’s response to the proffered strategy is through a cash-settled “total 
return swap,” in which the party taking the long side of the swap gets ex-
actly the return of the equivalent equity position without actually holding 
or obtaining the shares.171 The swap is a bet about the movement of the 
stock price. When the swap is unwound, the parties settle up. Stock 
appreciation results in a cash payment of the gains to the activist; a stock 
price decline requires the activist to pay out the losses on the deemed 
position to the counterparty.  
In theory, this should be unobjectionable as a policy matter in four 
separate respects. First, the activist is doubling down on its investment 
without gaining additional voting leverage to force the adoption of its 
proposal. This reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior by the activist 
or other forms of private benefit extraction because the bet increases 
while decision rights do not. The separation of cash flow rights from 
control rights goes in the direction that tilts against the activist’s goals if 
those goals are defined as securing voting rights. Second, for the institu-
tional shareholders who ultimately decide whether to support an 
activist’s proposal, the fact that the activist takes a greater economic stake 
based solely on the performance of the stock is a credible signal of a 
high-quality proposal: It increases the size of the activist’s bet on its 
proposal without influencing the corporation’s decision whether to 
accept it. Third, for the activist, the synthetic stock position increases its 
returns from its toehold equity investment and thus encourages the 
investment in the first place. Fourth, for shareholders generally, the 
opportunity for higher returns to the activist through proposals that are 
screened by disinterested institutional decisionmakers will increase the 
occasions of high-quality shareholder activism, thereby generally 
reducing the agency costs of agency capitalism.  
As developed in the literature172 and one important case,173 a major 
concern is that a total return swap in practice can convey voting rights in 
                                                                                                                 
171 . See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the 
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 13 J. Corp. Fin. 343, 344 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Decoupling] 
(explaining cash-settled equity swap); infra notes 172–173 and accompanying text 
(explaining total return swaps can give voting rights in addition to economic interest). 
172. See Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and the Efficiency of 
Corporate Governance, 99 J. Fin. Econ. 289, 289 (2011) (“[S]ome funds may use ‘empty 
voting’—a practice whereby they accumulate voting power in excess of their economic 
share ownership—to manipulate shareholder vote outcomes and generate trading 
gains.”); Hu & Black, Decoupling, supra note 171, at 344–45 (describing “decoupling” of 
economic ownership from voting power via derivatives); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, 
The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 811, 828–32 (2006) (same); Kahan & Rock, supra note 95, at 1075–77 (describing 
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addition to an economic interest and thereby undercut the policy behind 
the 5% ownership disclosure trigger. Moreover, assembling this trans-
threshold economic stake can occur with relatively low visibility, such that 
it will not activate the self-checking mechanism of block building 
through market purchases. 174  This is because the “short” swap 
counterparties will hedge their position by “going long” the stock, that is, 
through stock purchases.175 And because of their client relationship with 
the activist, the argument is that counterparties will not be unbiased in 
their behavior: They will vote in favor of the activist’s proposal in an 
effort to sustain relationships with their client.176 Moreover, the stock is 
available for acquisition whenever the activist chooses. The activist has 
control over the timing of the swap’s unwinding. When the swap is un-
wound, the counterparties want to reverse their hedge, the sooner the 
better, and the activist stands ready to buy the blocks and the vote.177  
The analysis here is a “possibility theorem.” Counterparties claim not 
to behave in this way and are especially sensitive after the federal district 
court’s opinion in CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management 
(UK) LLP.178 Nevertheless, the SEC is called to arms to avoid this scenario 
through an amendment of the Regulation 13D rules to include even 
purely economic stock positions, as through cash-settled swaps and other 
derivatives, within the scope of beneficial ownership and so further limit 
                                                                                                                 
“empty voting” as result of derivative position as “example of an old problem—conflict of 
interests created by exploiting the separation of legal and beneficial ownership—
aggravated by modern financial innovation”); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775, 780 (describing as “economically 
encumbered” shareholders who lack “homogenous incentives” because they “hold both a 
share and a short or other derivative position”); Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge Funds and Risk-
Decoupling—The Empty Voting Problem in the European Union, Seattle U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135489 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing examples and problems of empty voting 
in United States and European Union); Michael C. Shouten, The Case for Mandatory 
Ownership Disclosure, 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 127, 160–63, 170–72 (2009) (discussing 
“hidden ownership” and “empty voting”).  
173. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519–
23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining mechanism and purposes of total return swaps), aff’d, 292 
F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). 
174. By “self-checking,” we mean that increases in stock price associated with 
sustained direct purchasing will commonly impose practical restraints for activists seeking 
to profit from price appreciation in the blocks they acquire. See supra note 159 and 
accompanying text (explaining how share accumulation is impounded in market price).  
175. See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (explaining swap counterparties are not “in 
the business . . . of taking on the stupendous risks entailed in holding unhedged short (or 
long) positions in significant percentages of the shares of listed companies” and “their 
positions could not be hedged through the use of other derivatives”). 
176. See id. at 545–46. 
177. See id. at 546. 
178. See id. at 552 (holding defendant’s total return swap position constituted 
“beneficial ownership” under Rule 13d-3 because it had ability to influence voting, 
purchase, or sale decisions by swap counterparties). 
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the size of the economic stake an activist can take in support of its 
strategy.179  
We have two responses. First, in the post-Dodd-Frank world, 
counterparties may come to lose their hypothesized behind-the-curtain 
power to deliver votes and shares. Equity derivatives may come to be 
traded on exchanges, or the process of central clearing may interpose a 
central clearing party between the two sides to the trade.180 In other 
words, hedging may come to be effected quite differently, in a way that 
drastically reduces the possibility of hidden votes. The SEC should at 
least wait to see how that plays out before defining beneficial ownership 
in a fashion that is dictated only by beliefs concerning the informal 
operation of the derivatives market and the relationship between 
transacting parties.  
Second, the SEC could address the issue more narrowly and more 
directly simply by defining beneficial ownership to exclude a total return 
swap that has been “sterilized” through a mirrored voting commitment 
with respect to any proposal or proxy contest mounted by the activist 
counterparty. In a sterilized swap, the counterparties are obliged to cast 
their votes to mimic the voting behavior of the disinterested share-
holders. This proposal preserves the advantages of letting activists 
increase the size of their economic bet on their proposal, while still pro-
tecting section 13(d)’s policy of restraining the possibility of sudden 
control shifts.  
In the end, the case in favor of accelerating the disclosure of an 
activist shareholder’s toehold stake is a claim that the legislative history 
that animated the Williams Act and section 13(d), based on the structure 
of the capital markets forty-five years ago, should dictate the SEC’s exer-
cise of its discretion now in the face of radically different capital markets 
and after the reconcentration of share ownership that has given rise to 
agency capitalism. 181  Figure 4 illustrates the mismatch between this 
argument and current conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (outlining such proposals). 
180. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–81 (2010) (requiring persons engaging in swap 
transaction to “submit[] such swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization” and 
requiring swap transactions subject to clearing requirements to be executed on “board of 
trade designated as a contract market” or “swap execution facility”). The SEC has recently 
finalized certain rules for security-based swaps, which include equity derivatives, in a 
release that provides useful background. See Process for Submissions for Review of 
Security-Based Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing 
Agencies, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,601 (July 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).  
181. See supra notes 155–157 and accompanying text (discussing argument based on 
legislative history). 
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FIGURE 4: SETTING THE CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1967, institutional investors collectively owned a relatively small 
percentage of U.S. equities. Stock ownership was still largely in the hands 
of individuals. The governance problem was that of Berle and Means: 
managers who were not accountable to widely dispersed shareholders. As 
Part II shows, the evolution of the capital markets over the last forty-five 
years has reconcentrated ownership: Institutional investors now own 73% 
of the largest one thousand U.S. corporations,182 and the three largest 
mutual fund families own 18.75% of total U.S. public equities and direct 
the voting of a much larger percentage.183 The result has been to shift 
governance concerns to those of agency capitalism: the devaluation of 
governance rights that results from those rights being held by investment 
intermediaries who rationally undervalue them. Activist shareholders 
then function as a response to concentrated institutional ownership and 
as a means to arbitrage the value of governance rights by creating the 
opportunity for reticent institutional record shareholders to act in their 
beneficiaries’ interest. Nothing requires that the SEC ignore dramatic 
changes in the capital markets over the last forty-five years when 
evaluating the current section 13(d) disclosure regime.  
CONCLUSION 
We have described an embedded monitoring shortfall in the 
dominant form of share ownership in the United States and other juris-
dictions as well. Intermediary institutional investors are highly effective 
vehicles for financial intermediation and risk bearing. Their effectiveness 
derives in part from the specialization that also gives rise to what we have 
called the agency costs of agency capitalism. Rather than insist that 
institutions remodel themselves in a fashion that is inconsistent with their 
business model and therefore unlikely to succeed, we have suggested that 
the downside of specialization may be best addressed by fostering the 
development of a complementary set of specialists, in this case, activist 
                                                                                                                 
182. See supra Table I. 
183. See supra notes 78 and accompanying text. 
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shareholders, a species of hedge funds. On the governance dimension, 
institutional investors are not so much rationally passive as rationally 
reticent. The interaction between shareholder activists and institutional 
investors—one proposing, the other disposing—gives value to the institu-
tions’ low-powered governance capacities, in effect operating to arbitrage 
the undervaluation of governance rights in the hands of reticent institu-
tional investors. Governance markets thus become more complete. The 
net result is better monitoring and, perhaps, lower agency costs in the 
real economy.  
To be sure, there is a risk that both institutional investors and activist 
investors may be myopic, to the end of increasing the value of a specula-
tive option.184 But there is a corresponding risk that company managers 
may be hyperopic, acting to increase the option value of their control by 
extending its length, especially if, because of poor performance and 
strategy, it is then out of the money. No governance structure will per-
fectly distinguish between those alternatives, in part because the conflict-
ing views are not mutually exclusive and both sides may have come to 
hold those views in good faith. In the end, we do best by allowing activist 
shareholders to bet their assets on their ability to persuade sophisticated 
institutional investors that they are right in their assessment of portfolio 
company strategy. 
  
                                                                                                                 
184. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term 
Investors 13–16 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstr
act=2188661 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (designing security that would make 
investors more long-term-oriented). 
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